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Note
"Chinese Characteristics" in Corporate Clothing:

Questions of Fiduciary Duty in China's
Company Law
Michael Irl Nikkel
INTRODUCTION
In 1978, under the leadership of Deng Xiaoping, the People's Republic of China (PRC) began a second long march 1 toward a modified free-market economy. 2 In the intervening two
decades, China's market reforms have created an unprecedented
period of economic growth for the country.3 The growth has not
gone unnoticed abroad. Since 1990, American companies have
1. The People's Republic of China (PRO) came into existence in 1949 after
Mao Zedong and his Communist revolutionaries went on a 5,000-mile "long
march" through China in order to drive Chiang Kai-sheles flagging
Guomindang government from the mainland to Taiwan.
2. "[T]he Third Plenary Session of the 11th Central Committee of the
Communist Party of China... launched a policy of economic reform and opened
China to increased contacts with the outside world." Andrew Xuefeng Qian,
Riding Two Horses:CorporatizingEnterprisesand the EmergingSecuritiesRegulatory Regime in China, 12 UCLA PAC. BASrN L.J. 62, 65 (1993).
3. "Between 1978 and 1993, China approved over 172,000 FDI [foreign
direct investment] contracts with total utilized capital exceeding fifty-nine billion dollars, propelling it into the ranks of major users of FDI in the developing
world." Wei Jia, Tidal Changes in Chinese ForeignInvestment Laws and Policies, 2 TUL. J. IN'L & CoMP. L. 23, 24 (1994). According to official statistics,
foreign investment in China rose 49% from the first nine months of 1993 to the
same period in 1994. Investment Continues to Grow in China, Xinhua News
Agency, Oct. 23, 1994, available in LEXIS, NEXIS Library, XINHUA File. In
addition, China continues to experience one of the world's steepest real economic growth rates-a healthy nine percent in 1994. Alan W.N. Kitehin et al.,
Doing Business in Asia: Focus on Japan, India, and Vietnam, A.L.I.-A.B.A.
CouRsE OF STUDY, Sept. 29, 1994, available in WESTLAW, ALI-ABA Database.
Others have advised foreign investors to exercise caution in the market.
See the advice given by Todd Carrel & Richard Hornik, A Chinese Gold Rush?
Don't Hold Your Breath, N.Y. Tnjs, Sept. 14, 1994, at A19. Carrel and Hornik
portend that the "latest American bout of Sinophoria tramples economic horse
sense." Id. They report that the "economic backwardness" of China, including
its lack of sufficient investor protections, stymies commercial success and creates overall losses for United States companies and individuals operating in the
market. Id.

504

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 80:503

directly invested more than fifteen billion dollars into China
through joint ventures and wholly foreign-owned enterprises established on the mainland. 4 By 1994, worldwide contracted foreign direct investment in China surged to eighty-one billion
5
dollars.
Despite the Chinese government's 1988 "austerity measures,"6 and the latest two-year round of centrally mandated
tight money policies, 7 China continues to strengthen the role of
free-market forces in its economy.8 This market reform movement derives in part from China's experience with its grossly
inefficient state-owned enterprises (SOEs). 9 In restructuring
these debt-ridden entities and transitioning to a market economy, China sees the opportunity to provide greater investment
alternatives for its domestic and foreign investors. 10 In the late1980s China began to accommodate investors by allowing Western-style companies to emerge replete with shares, sharehold4. Investment Data, CmNA Bus. REV., May-June 1995, at 32, 33; Jia,
supra note 3, at 41-42; see also John J. Oslund, Chinese Puzzle: MinnesotanHas
Idea for Dealing With Trade Dilemma-A Code of Conduct, MINNEAPOLIS STAR
TalB., May 19, 1994, at D1 (reporting that Minnesota companies are investing
significantly in China).
5. Investment Data, supra note 4, at 32.
6. In an effort to slow down what it viewed as an overheated economy and
double-digit inflation, the Chinese government limited the availability of operating credit and raw materials. See Nicholas D. Kristof, China Again Moves
CentralPlanningto CenterStage, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 21, 1989, at Al; Nicholas D.
Kristof, State's Share of BusinessesFalls in China, N.Y. TIMEs, Mar. 20, 1989,
at D4.
7. See Kathy Chen & Joseph Kahn, ChinaApplies the Brakes to Reforms,
WALL ST. J., Apr. 7, 1995, at A10. The Beijing government has been striving to
quell a persistent nationwide inflation rate that averaged 25% in 1994. Id. At
the opening of the Third Plenum of the Eighth National People's Congress on
March 5, 1995, China's Prime Minister Li Peng detailed plans to slow down the
lift-ing of price controls and to improve the food supply through central mandates. Mark O'Neill, China Admits Policy Mistakes on Inflation, Reuter Newswire-Far East, Mar. 5, 1995, available in WESTLAW, INT-NEWS Database.
8. Examples include China's enactment of such pro-business legislation
as a private enterprise law, a bankruptcy law and a joint venture law. See generally Alison W. Conner, To Get Rich is Precarious:Regulation of PrivateEnterprise in the People'sRepublic Of China,5 J. CHiNsE L. 1, 5, 17 (1991) (detailing
the rise, decline and eventual revival of private enterprise in China since 1978).
9. See China to Sacrifice Failures,LLOYDS LIST, May 28, 1994, available
in WESTLAW, INT-NEWS Database; Foo Choy Peng, State Sector Holds Key to
Future;Economists Agree on Need to Tackle Problemof SOEs, S. CHINA MoRNING POST, July 7, 1994, Chinese Bus. Rev. Section, at 1; Zhou Weirong, National
Enterprises Face FurtherReforms, CHiNA DAILY, Oct. 4, 1994, at 2.
10. Marcus W. Brauchli, With China's Economy Cooling, Beijing Renews
Rhetoric on RegainingTaiwan, WALL ST. J., Feb. 3, 1995, at A8. For a detailed
analysis of foreign investment in China, see generally Jia, supra note 3.
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ers, and public offerings on foreign stock exchanges and its own
newly-created Shanghai and Shenzhen exchanges. 11 A series of
local laws and national administrative opinions regulated these
new companies until China's National People's Congress enacted the country's first-ever national Company Law in December 1993.12 Today, foreign corporations increasingly see the
purchase of a minority equity stake in Chinese listed companies
as a means of bypassing extended joint venture negotiations and
government approvals, thereby gaining a quick foothold on the
mainland.1 3 Because these companies are governed by the new
Company Law, this Note undertakes a critical analysis of the
shareholder investment protections afforded
by the Company
14
Law and China's governmental structures.
11. Marcus W. Brauchli & Kathy Chen, Major Chinese Firms May Offer
Shares in Hong Kong, but Gripes, Doubts Occur, WALL ST. J., Feb. 12, 1993, at
All; Renee Lai, Firm Readies for HK Listing; Chengdu Telecom Restructures
for Float in Territory, S. CHINA MORNING POST, Oct. 4, 1994, at 5. Brilliance
China Automotive Holdings was the first mainland Chinese company to list on
the New York Stock Exchange. Bumpy Road for Car Groups, FIN. TIMES, Nov.
18, 1993, Section Ill, at IX. In October 1994, Chinese officials estimated the
number of New York Stock Exchange-listed companies at ten, with three more
on the way. Zhao Renfang, China GraduallyEntering World CapitalMarketAn Interview with Chinese CSRC Chairman, Xinhua News Agency, Oct. 7,
1994, available in LEXIS, NEXIS Library, XINHUA File (paraphrasing remarks made by Liu Hongru, Chairman of the China Securities Regulatory
Commission). Prior to the formation of shareholding companies, the only investment vehicles available to foreigners were joint ventures or wholly foreignowned enterprises, both of which required substantial outlays not commonly
associated with private investments. See Yabo Lin, New Forms and Organizational Structures of Foreign Investment in China Under the Company Law of
the PRC, 7 TRANSNAT'L LAw. 327, 333 (1994).
12. The Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Gongsifa [Company Law of the
PRC] became effective on July 1, 1994. The full text of the Company Law is
translated into English in CHINAS CoiPANY LAW: THE NEW LEGISLATION 7
(Guiguo Wang trans., 1994) [hereinafter Company Law].
13. See Karen Cooper, Investors Exploit China Loopholes, EVFZHNG STANDARD, Aug. 24, 1995, at 36, available in LEXIS, WORLD Library, ESTAND
File; Tony Walker, Ford Skates Around Chinese Freeze: Share-Buying Avoids
the Joint Ventures Ban, FIN. Trams, Sept. 7, 1995, at 16; see also Joseph Kahn,
Chinese Markets Soar on Interest by Foreigners:Class A Share Reform Could
Widen Holdings but Obstacles Remain, AsiAN WALL ST. J., Sept. 6, 1994, at 1,
available in WESTLAW, WSJ-ASIA Database ("Fueled by news of strong interest from foreign brokerage firms eager to invest in China's domestically traded
Class A shares, the nation's stock market indexes on Monday surged to their
highest levels of the year.").
14. "China's expanding economy has attracted billions of dollars of foreign
investment, but Beijing has made limited progress in setting up regulations to
protect those investments." Dealing with China: Lawyer Discusses Investor
Protection, AsiAN WALL ST. J., Apr. 25, 1994, at 3, available in WESTLAW,
WSJ-ASIA Database [hereinafter Dealing with China].
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Although aimed at making managers answerable to shareholders, 15 China's new Company Law contains conflicting provisions that could undermine the accountability inherent in the
corporate setting. 16 This Note critiques these dissonant provisions and the challenges associated with China's underdeveloped legal system. These problems assume added importance as
the number of investors from the United States, Europe and the
Pacific Rim continues to swell. 17 Part I provides a glimpse of
China's business past, identifies the reasons for the Company
Law's promulgation, and examines the systemic inadequacies of
China's current governmental structure that will affect the
Law's viability. Part H provides an overview of shareholder, director and managerial responsibilities in the new Chinese companies and examines their correlation with corporate fiduciary
duties under United States law. Part HI analyzes the tension
created between the managers of majority state-owned jointstock companies formed under the Company Law and their minority shareholders. Part IV suggests changes that might give
investors more meaningful protection from a director or manager's breach of corporate fiduciary duties. This Note concludes
that China should strengthen its progressive Company Law by
giving shareholders an adequate means of redress against managers who breach their official duties.

15. See infra notes 78-85 and accompanying text (discussing Chinese management's need for accountability).
16. See infra text accompanying notes 72-73 (discussing the inherent accountability provided by a business form where directors and managers are required to answer for their business decisions to shareholders who have a direct
pecuniary interest in the company). The idea for this Note derived from a meeting with University of Minnesota Law School Professor of Chinese Law, Tahirih
V. Lee after a conversation Professor Lee had with Mr. Yanlei Wu. Interview
with Talirih V. Lee in Minneapolis, Minn. (Sept. 8, 1994). Mr. Wu is an attorney with the law firm of Latham & Watkins in Washington, D.C. The author of
this Note wishes to express his thanks to Professor Lee for commenting on an
earlier draft of this article as well as providing insight into China's unique and
often misunderstood tese (characteristics).
17. Total foreign direct investment in China has increased over 600% since
1991. Investment Data, supra note 4, at 32. The bulk of this investment in
recent years has come from Hong Kong, Taiwan, the United States, Japan and
Germany. Id. at 33.
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I. THE LONG MARCH TO MARKET REFORM

A. CORPORATE AcTWTY

AND

REGULATION PRIOR TO 1978

The corporate form of business is not new to China.', Foreign companies established a stronghold in the country after the
Opium War of 1840.19 Recognizing the need to "promote the creation of Chinese companies to compete with the foreigners who
"2 o
were producing and marketing their goods on Chinese soil,
the late Qing dynasty promulgated its own company law in
1904.21 The succeeding Nationalist government continued the
Qing's reforms by codifying a new company law in 1929.22
Under Mao Zedong's leadership, the Chinese Communist
Party (the Party) took a far different approach to corporate enterprise when it assumed power in 1949. The Party briefly allowed the 11,298 existing companies to remain in operation
before it declared the corporate enterprise inimical to socialism. 23 By the early 1950s, the Party had nationalized or collectivized all privately-held companies. 2 4 Party directives and
Maoist ideology, rather than market-oriented supply-and-demand forces, governed SOEs. 25
Other private enterprises, including more than one million
individual businesses and partnerships existing when the Communists came to power, also experienced harsh treatment by the
Chinese government after 1949.26 The Party's policy evolved
quickly from guarded toleration to socialist integration to ruth18. See generally ZHONGGUO

ZHENGQUAN SHOUCE [CHINA SECurRITIE HAND-

BOOK) 513-16, 527-29 (Liu Hongru ed., 1992) (providing historical background
of China's securities market) [hereinafter CBINA SEcuRiEs HANDBOOK].
19. See Qian, supra note 2, at 64 n.6.
20. William C. Kirby, China Unincorporated:Company Law and Business
Enterprise in Twentieth-Century China, 54 J. ASIAN STUD. 43, 43 (1995).
21. Id.
22. Id. at 51-52 (providing a brief history of China's corporate regulatory
past prior to the formation of the Communist state under Mao Zedong).
23. Id. at 56.
24. Id.
25. Donald C. Clarke, What'sLaw Got to do With it? Legal Institutionsand
Economic Reform in China, 10 UCLA PAC. BASIN L.J. 1, 5-6 (1991). Production
directives proffered by China's central government were never as extensive as
the former Soviet Union's. Id. This may have enhanced the Chinese governmenes willingness to accept economic reform under Deng Xiaoping beginning in
1978. Mr. Clarke notes that [iun 1977, before reform, some forty percent of
investment in state units was not centrally planned. Between 1982 and 1985,
that figure rose to sixty percent, an extraordinary number for a centrally
planned economy." Id. at 6.
26. Conner, supra note 8, at 3-5.
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less suppression.2 7 The shift in policy reflected the Party leadership's determination to eliminate any remaining vestiges of
capitalism, to develop China's infrastructure and to create a
strong, prosperous "New China."28 As a result, by 1978 less
than 150,000 persons
engaged in private business, and no stock
29
companies existed.
B. FOUNDATIONAL REFORMS

AND DiscREPANCIES iN THE POST-

1978 ERA
1.

Renewed Privatization

Under Deng's leadership, China cautiously renewed the viability and protection of private business. 30 In 1981, China began
allowing private enterprises to operate through extensive statutory and policy changes.3 1 Further, China revamped its constitution in 198232 and recognized the "rights" of "individual
businesses" and "private enterprise,"3 3 even though the changes
27. Id.
28. See generally JOHN N.

HAZARD, COMMUNISTS AND THEIR LAw 177-80
(1969) (elucidating the plight of capitalist enterprise in China). For a discussion of the alternative strategies of socialist development attempted in China

during the period, see Peter Van Ness & Satish Raichur, Dilemmas of Socialist
Development: An Analysis of Strategic Lines in China, 1949-1981, in MAumr
REFORMS IN SOCIALIST SOCIETIES: COMPARING CHINA AND HUNGARY

143 (Peter

Van Ness ed., 1989).

29. Conner, supra note 8, at 5.
30. Matthew D. Bersani, Privatizationand the Creation of Stock Companies in China, 1993 COLUM. Bus. L. REV. 301, 303. This is different from the
reform minded, formerly communist countries of Eastern Europe in which some
countries took a deliberate and immediate stance embracing private ownership
of various industries. Id.
31. The first of such laws was Guowuyuan Guanyu Chengzhen Feinongye
Geti Jingji Ruogan Zhengcexing Guiding [Certain Policy Provisions by the
State Council of the PRC Relating to the Non-agricultural Individual Economy
in Cities and Townships] art. 5 (promulgated July 7, 1981), in 1 ZHONGGUO
JiNGJi GUANLI FAGUI WENJiAN HuHiiAN [PROvISION AND DOCUMENT COLLECTION
OF THE MANAGEMENT OF CHINA'S ECONOMY]

377-79 (Jilin Renmin Chubanshe

[Jilin People's Publishing House] 1985). "Individual enterprises" obtained their
legal status with the passage of Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Minfa Tongze
[The General Rules of the Civil Law of the PRC] § IV, art. 28 (adopted Apr. 12,
1986), translatedin 3 COMMERCIAL, BUSINESS AND TRADE LAws: PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA 59, 71-72 (Owen D. Nee ed., 1987) [hereinafter Civil Law].

32.

ZHONGHUA RENMIN GONGHEGUO XIANFA [CONSTrrUTION OF THE

PRC]

arts. 8 and 11 (adopted Dec. 4, 1982), translatedin 4 CONSTITUTIONS OF THE
COUNTRIES OF THE WORLD 35, 39 (Albert P. Balustein & Gisbert H. Flanz eds.,
1992) [hereinafter CHINESE CONST.].
33. These terms refer to the type of private ownership allowed in China
prior to the formation of stock companies which, in recent years, consisted of
small, family type businesses with no shareholding system. Preston M. Tor-
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did not clearly articulate these rights. 34 These provisions, however, laid the foundation for China's new conception of private
ownership and control of business enterprise. 35
The Civil Law of 1986 expanded upon the statutory revisions and re-established a legal basis for private business in its
corporate form.3 6 The Civil Law provides for the regulation of
bert, China'sEvolving Company Legislation:A Status Report, 14 Nw. J. INT'L L.
& Bus. 1, 2 (1993).
34. For example, it was unclear whether the owner of a business had a
right to bring suit in one of the local People's Courts for breach of contract.
Bersani, supra note 30, at 304 n.16.
In April, 1988, the National People's Congress directly granted legal protections to the private sector by amending the 1982 Constitution to provide that
the "state protects the lawful rights and interests of the individual economy,"
thereby allowing owners to sue for business related infringements. CHINESE
CONST., supra note 32, art. 11, at 63 (amended Apr. 12, 1988). The amendment
provides that the state is to "exercise[ I guidance, supervision and control over
the private sector economy." Id. Thus, prior to the Company Law's formation,
private ownership of business seemed to take a back seat to the state's power to
direct the management of that business.
Later that summer and in the following year, the State Council, the highest
regulatory authority in China, clarified the amendment by issuing interpretive
regulations defining private enterprise, providing rules for its establishment
and dissolution and exerting control over its labor relations and financial affairs. See Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Siying Qiye Suodeshui Zhanxing
Tiaoli [Provisional Regulations of the PRC Concerning Income Tax on Private
Enterprises] (promulgated June 25, 1988); Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Siying Qiye Zhanxing Tiaoli [Provisional Regulations of the PRC Concerning Private Enterprises]; Guanyu Zhengshou Siying Qiye Touzizhe Geren Shouru
Tiaojieshui De Guiding [Provisions Relating to the Imposition of Individual Income Regulatory Tax on Investors in Private Enterprises] (promulgated June
25, 1988), all translatedin E. AsLAN ExEcuTnE REP., Oct. 15, 1988, at 26, available in LEXIS, NEXIS Library, EASIAN File.
35. See Conner, supra note 8, at 19 (outlining the provisions pertaining to
private enterprise). The reform measures significantly impacted the private
sector. According to official statistics, by June 1994 there were more than 31
million self-employed in China with registered funds totaling more than 100
billion yuan (US$12 billion) and business volume of more than 265 billion yuan
(US$31.9 billion). Beijing Newspaper Highlights,Xinhua News Agency, Sept.
25, 1994, available in LEXIS, NEXIS Library, XINHUA File.
China enacted laws pertaining to joint ventures between foreign companies
and domestic entities early in the reform process. See The Law of the People's
Republic of China on Joint Ventures Using Chinese and Foreign Investment
(adopted July 1, 1979); The Law of the People's Republic of China on ChineseForeign Contractual Joint Ventures (adopted Apr. 13, 1988), all available in
LEXIS, ASIAPC Library, CHINAL File. While these laws provided a basis
upon which the Chinese government could draw while developing the Company
Law, they do not deal with private ownership by investors of the entity being

created as the Company Law does.
36. Kirby, supra note 20, at 43 (discussing the history of China's corporatization process). For the Civil Law, see Civil Law, supra note 31. China's
State Council in 1988 enhanced China's Civil Law with the promulgation of the
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business and personal relationships among Chinese citizens, between "legal persons," and between citizens and "legal persons." 37 Entities such as joint ventures, SOEs and new
companies are examples of the "legal persons" contemplated by
the law. In other words, the "legal persons" the law creates can
be fictional corporate persons. They obtain this status when the
enterprises are established in accordance with the appropriate
law.38 Accordingly, the Civil Law guarantees that once establishment and registration are complete, an enterprise is a "legal
person" that has the capacity for civil rights in conducting lawful
activities-it may lawfully conduct business under the protection of law.3 9 As a "legal person," the entity gains a judicial remedy in the event of a contractual or other breach of law by
another company, a joint venture, an SOE or a Chinese citizen.
2.

China's Administrative Agency Quandary:
Decentralization as Progress and Paralysis

Codification of China's laws in the last two decades has
brought major difficulties because China lacks dependable local
enforcement agencies needed to protect newly formed private
enterprises. 40 At this stage of reform, the power of the local
Party hierarchy often overrides the wishes of the central government in enforcing national laws. For example, local Party officials might require a new company to obtain one set of operation
permits that conflict with national regulations. 4 1 This problem
Provisional Regulations of the PRC Concerning Private Enterprises, supra note
34. These provisional regulations were "formulate[d] to encourage and guide
the healthy development of private enterprises, [and] to safeguard their legal
rights and interests." Id. art. 1. Interestingly, limited liability companies, even
at this early date, were listed as a type of private enterprise under the purview
of the law. Id. art. 6.
37. Civil Law, supra note 31, art. 2.
38. Id. art. 37. The entity must have the necessary funding to bear civil
liability and properly register its name, organizational structure, place of business, and designate a person or persons who will represent the enterprise in
capacity as a legal person. Id. arts. 37 and 38.
39. Id. arts. 36, 41.
40. "The most enlightened policies are useless if for some reason they cannot be implemented." Clarke, supra note 25, at 3 (elucidating the relationship
of economic reform and legal reform). See generally POLICY IMPLEmENTATioN IN
POST-MAO CHINA (D. Lampton ed., 1987) (providing a collection of studies on
the enforcement issue in China).
41. Problems have surfaced in ways that are well known to foreign business persons and stem from a variety of factors. See Margaret L.H. Png, Equity
Joint Ventures in the People's Republic of China:Problems that Continue After
More than a Decade Underthe Open DoorPolicy, 24 Case W. Res. J. Int'l L. 589,
618-20 (1992) (detailing the account of two joint ventures where local authori-
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stems from the broad political and economic decentralization
that has occurred since the early 1980s. 4 2
In the years after the economic reforms began, the provinces
and municipalities accumulated power through the decentralization process. 4 3 A fragmented polity has emerged whereby provincial and local Party officials are able to act independently of
the central government.44 As the Beijing government gives localities more discretion to meet centrally created production
goals, 4 5 provincial and municipal authorities tend to enforce national laws and regulations only when the laws benefit their loties went outside of the Joint Venture Laws to interfere with a manager's employment status in the venture); James D. Zirin, Markets and the Rule of Law,
FORBES, Sept. 12, 1994, at 114 (stating that the "Chinese court system is capricious, communist and presumptively corrupt"). This could also be due to unfamiliarity by local officials of the new legislation that China has produced. The
education process for local officials about new laws sometimes takes years to
accomplish. This author, after speaking with several dual U.S. and Chinese
licensed attorneys, discovered that the attorneys often had to educate local officials about new laws and registration processes that the local officials were supposed to implement, simply because the officials were unaware of their
responsibilities.
42. Clarke, supra note 25, at 14. Law-making at the local level gained increased respect in 1985 when the Supreme People's Court of China held that
the judiciary would recognize provincial legislation as being applicable in its
adjudication of economic disputes. FAZHI RBAO [LEGAL SYSTEM DAILY], Dec. 11,
1985. Albert H.Y. Chen denotes the extent of local lawmaking when he says
that:
The quantity of local regulations which have been made since 1979 is
now significant and demonstrates that the PRC law-making system is
no longer the highly centralized one which it had been in the period
1954-1978. Thus, in the period 1979-1988, 1,233 pieces of local regulations ... were made, among which 90.2% were made at the provincial
level ....
The content of local regulations is also significant in the
sense that some cover topics which, at the time of their enactment,
were not yet regulated by national legislation, and hence the local regulations on these topics paved the way for the subsequent enactment of
national legislation on the topics.
ALBERT H.Y. CHEN, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE LEGAL SYSTEM OF THE PEOPLE'S
REPUBLIC OF CHINA

87 (1992). This is true for the Company Law.

43. Clarke, supra note 25, at 14-15.
44. Mini-kingdoms are created in which province is pitted against province
to draw in the perks of state-run industry and foreign investment. See Kevin
Murphy, For Many China Firms, an Order to Sink or Swim, I'L HERALD
TRm., Aug. 13, 1993, available in LEXIS, NEXIS Library, lHIT File. (reporting
that Beijing closed more than 1000 unauthorized development zones which
were offering tax concessions and other incentives to encourage foreign investment outside of central government supervision).
45. See Barry Naughton, China'sExperience with Guidance Planning,14 J.
Comp. EcoN. 743, 745 (1990) (discussing China's failure in guidance planning
which has resulted in high levels of instability and persistent imbalance of the
economy). Local authorities, especially prior to reform, had to fulfill mandatory
production targets set in Beijing whether or not they matched with their enter-
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cale or when Beijing imposes specific pressure upon them.4 6 The
inability of the central government to enforce its legislation is,
47
therefore, a major obstacle to the progress of China's reforms.
3.

The Enduring Problem of Judicial Deference to the Party
Within China

China's court system plays only a small role within the government hierarchy. The standing of the courts continues to be
an impediment to enforcing laws passed by the central government. 48 Unlike the United States, where judgments in one state
are respected by another under the Full Faith and Credit
Clause, 49 the courts of one Chinese province may decide not to
enforce an extraterritorial decision when it has a negative imprise's capabilities. Wang Haibao, GreaterPowerfor the Enterprises,in CHINA'S
ECONOMIC REFORMS 67, 67 (L. Wei & A. Chao eds., 1982).
46. See Li Maoguan, Why "Laws Go Unenforced", BEIJING REv., Sept. 1117, 1989, at 17, 18. "[Tlhe congruence of interests of the enterprise and its [governing body] means that legal supervision will often be nothing more than selfsupervision, with predictable consequences." Clarke, supra note 25, at 71.
"Where local authorities do not implement the law, remedies are essentially
nonexistent." Id. But c.f. Seth Goldberg, Internal and External Forces: Why
and How the Major Record Companies Will Successfully Access the Chinese
Market, 7 N.Y. INT'L L. REv. 45, 49 (1994) (citing evidence suggesting that Beijing's reluctance to enforce certain laws on a regional basis is due to lack of
incentive, not ability). However, "[s]tarting last month with a 16-point plan
aimed at tightening credit and regaining control of an economy splintering into
regional and municipal power centers, the deputy prime minister, Zhu Rongji,
has targeted China's economy for sweeping structural change." Murphy, supra
note 44.
47. "Now, it is historically difficult to enforce judgments in China .... "
Dealing with China, supra note 14; see also Andrew Xuefeng Qian, Why Does
Not the Rising Water Lift the Boat? Internationalizationof the Stock Markets
and the Securities RegulatoryRegime in China, 29 INT'L LAw. 615, 627 (1995)
("Indeed, enforcement activity in China is so far not significant, particularly in
cases involving overseas investment.").
48. China has four levels of general jurisdiction "People's Courts" and various specialized courts. See Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Renmin Fayuan
Zuzhifa [Law of the PRO on the Organization of People's Courts] (amended
[LAw YEAR BOOK OF CHINA] 221-23 (Falu
AjN
1983), in ZHONGGUO FALu Nm
Chubanshe [Law Publishing House] 1987). Although they have the putative
authority to make cross-jurisdictional and bureaucratic rulings, enforcement is
often difficult. See infra text accompanying notes 49-53 (discussing enforcement difficulties). The cases reported by China's highest level court, the
Supreme People's Court, cannot be cited by lower courts and usually include
little or no legal reasoning. Nanping Liu, "Legal Precedents" with Chinese
Characteristics:Published Cases in the Gazette of the Supreme People'sCourt, 5
J. CHwnEsE L. 107, 108 (1991). It was not until 1985 that the Court began to
publish cases in the Zuigao Renmin Fayuan Gongbao [Gazette of the Supreme
People's Court]. Id. at 107.
49. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1.
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pact on an enterprise in the local district. 50 Because China is a
civil law country, local courts do not necessarily follow the decisions of China's highest court in Beijing.5 1 Further, the strength
of the Party allows local Party officials to subvert court orders
without consequence. 5 2 A court is dependent on the Party for
50. Yao, Bingchu DifangBaohu Zhuyi, Yi Fa Weihu Qiye Quanyi [Get Rid
of Local Protectionism: Uphold the Rights and Interests of EnterprisesAccording to Law], FAZHI RIBAO [LEGAL SYsTEM DAILY], Apr. 14, 1989, at 3. The
GUANGMmnG RiBAO [GuANGMIG DAmY] conveyed the following report:
It happened that an economic and trade company of Shenzhen made a
deal on plywood with the Dalian Liansuo Company. The Dalian company had delivered the payment, but the company in Shenzhen failed
to fulfill its part of the contract. In December 1990, the Liaoning Advanced Court ruled that the Shenzhen company must pay the other
party a 14 million yuan indemnity, including principal and interest. In
1991, the Dalian Intermediate People's Court filed the case for law enforcement. For three years and more in its wake, the Dalian authorities made four trips to Shenzhen on that matter, but in vain. During
the last trip to Shenzhen, cadres and policemen from the people's court
forcefully closed down the company concerned in accordance with the
law, having found its account number despite the fact that the company had already changed its name. However, when the cadres and
policemen began to implement the money transfer, they discovered
that the sum had already been transferred in secret under the pretext
that the bank had to protect its loans. The cadres and policemen visited around various departments, argued strongly on just grounds,
propagated the law, and fought for the support and cooperation of related departments. Pressed by the law and facts, eventually the bank
had to cooperate with the court, and transferred the sum to Dalian.
Song Yanrong, Difficulties in Justice Courts' Law-Enforcement, Feb. 20, 1995,
at 4, translated and microformed on F.B.I.S.-CHI 95-054, Article Views Difficulty in Enforcing Court Rulings, Mar. 21, 1995, at 57, 57-58.
51. Even if local courts in China were to follow precedent, it might be years
before they would respond to matters in the same fashion as courts in the
United States. One commentator noted that with regard to securities laws in
the United States, the common law tradition has enabled a "huge web" to develop through the enactment of a series of federal and state laws with subsequent court interpretation of those laws. Qian, Why Does Not the Rising Water
Lift the Boat?, supra note 47, at 625.
52. Usually, judges lack bureaucratic rank within the party and thus authority to enforce the court's judgments against higher level officials. Clarke,
supra note 25, at 66 (listing problems with China's court system). Although
denied by party leadership, there continues to be evidence that local party secretaries and committees review and approve important decisions. Id. at 62-63
(stating that, although the official theory is that Party leadership is to be exercised at the level of legislation or general policy making, not in the adjudication
of special cases, breaking old habits has proved difficult).
An example of this process in action is enforcement of the Bankruptcy Law
of China. See Zhongua Renmin Gongheguo Qiye Pochanfa [The Law of the People's Republic of China Governing Enterprise Bankruptcy] (1986), in E. AsmN
ExEcuTrvE REP., Mar. 15, 1987, at 23, availablein LEXIS, NEXIS Library, EASIAN File. Since enactment of the law in 1986, only 2000 of the 29,520 SOEs
running in the red have filed for bankruptcy protection. China Plans New
Bankruptcy Law, WALL ST. J., Dec. 30, 1994, at A5. Through February 1991,
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enforcement of its decisions; a court's own enforcement department may refuse to provide the assistance necessary to implement the court's order after issuance. 53
Although China has made valiant efforts to reform its legal
system in the past decade and a half, courts continue to display
slavish obedience to the Party's authority. 54 In an attempt to
combat this problem, Beijing officials have repeatedly called for
the separation of the Party hierarchy from the judiciary. 5 5 The
legal system, however, continues to lag behind the pace of progress in the economy 5 6 and it is likely that the Party does not
wish to see any real encroachment on its own power. Thus, a
judgment obtained by a shareholder/owner of a company against
final dissolution occurred at only one of these state-owned firms. See Clarke,
supra note 25, at 52 (analyzing the effectiveness of the law in guiding enterprise
behavior). China recently began drafting a new bankruptcy law in an attempt
to combat this problem. China Plans New Bankruptcy Law, supra, at A5 (reporting on China's intention to draft a new bankruptcy law to "meet the requirements of a market economy"); see also Qiao Gangliang, Don't Shy Away
From Litigationin China, AsiAN WALL ST. J. WKLY., Apr. 3, 1995, at 12 (positing that there are three additional reasons why litigation is difficult or not relied on: (1) precedents have no binding effect on lower courts because China is a
civil law country, and not a common law country; (2) Chinese courts are inadequately equipped to handle complex litigation; and (3) less-than-expected monetary damages result when a case is decided in favor of the plaintiff because
China does not yet recognize indirect and intangible damages); Yungeng Hu &
Jeffrey Sweet, Basics, Not Guanxi, Should Drive China Deals, Asim WALL ST.
J. WKLY., Jan. 16, 1995, at 14 (providing an example of a case between Chongqing Industrial and Commercial Bank and the Chongqing Textile Industrial Bureau where, although "a court ruled in favor of the plaintiff and allowed the
bank to seize the bureau's property, the court's order proved unenforceable" because local police arrived to protect the government when the bank attempted
to seize the bureau's property).
53. Song, supra note 50, at 58 (listing the causes for difficulties in law
enforcement).
54. See, e.g., William P. Alford, "Seek Truth from Facts"--EspeciallyWhen
They Are Unpleasant: America's Understandingof China's Efforts at Law Reform, 8 UCLA PAc. BASIN L.J. 177 (1990) (analyzing the impediments that have
impaired and threaten to continue to retard our understanding of Chinese legal
development, and seeking to reveal why China's judiciary remains inextricably
linked with and subservient to the Communist Party). The courts, furthermore, tend to be staffed largely by personnel who lack knowledge of the proper
role of the court system and of legal concepts. Id. at 183.
55. See China Reforms Handlingof Civil Lawsuits, Xinhua News Agency,
Aug. 30, 1994, available in LEXIS, NEXIS Library, XINHUA File (explaining
China's efforts to handle civil lawsuits in conformity with international
practice).
56. "Itwas learned that, in 1993, more than 100 law enforcement workers
were beaten to death or wounded in implementing court rulings across China."
Song, supra note 50, at 58; see also Donald C. Clarke, Dispute Resolution In
China, 5 J. CHniESE L. 245, 253-86 (1991) (discussing the in-court and out-court
mediation which constitutes the major dispute resolution in China).
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its officers and management could be nearly57impossible to enforce if it does not benefit the local economy.
The failings of China's People's Court system often results
in inadequate legal protection, causing business interests to
avoid bringing their cases to court. 58 Furthermore, although
formal litigation seems abhorrent to Chinese cultural tradition, 59 history shows that given a court system which facilitates
litigation, Chinese business persons, similar to their Western
counterparts, will sue to redress wrongs. 60 In the interim, an
enterprise's shareholders, whether Chinese or foreign, usually

57. "Some local leaders have intervened in the enforcement of court rulings, proceeding from local, partial interests, and a situation has surfaced in
which there are difficulties in enforcement of court rulings in one's own locality,
with still greater difficulties in enforcement in cases straddling other localities."
Song, supra note 50, at 58; see also Marcus W. Brauchli & Joseph Kahn, Honeymoon's Over, WALL ST. J., Dec. 2, 1994, at 1 (reporting that the "honeymoon"
between China and foreign business is ending because of China's constantly
shifting, arbitrary policies and reluctance to pay debts); Joseph Kahn, Sensitized by China's UnpaidBills, Banks, Brokers Tighten the Spigot, WALL ST. J.,
Dec. 16, 1994, at 16 (relating that foreign banks providing credit lines for Chinese companies to trade futures and foreign exchange on overseas markets, say
they expect to curtail their lending sharply in light of disputes over unpaid obligations); Review and Outlook: Big Mac Meets Big China, WALL ST. J., Dec. 2,
1994, at 14 (commenting on the difficulties faced by Western companies doing
business in China and noting that McDonald's was recently ordered to vacate a
site in Beijing in favor of a new development project).
58. One commentator noted:
As a U.S.-trained Chinese lawyer practicing in Beijing, it is my belief
that American interests in intellectual-property protection can be best
served by engaging Chinese courts, not avoiding them. The value of
winning a case under Chinese law goes well beyond specific damage
awards, because it puts all Chinese people-consumers and competitors-on notice that foreign businesses will use legal remedies to demand fair treatment from the Chinese legal system.
Qiao, supra note 52, at 12.
59. See generally Lucie Cheng & Arthur Rosett, Contract with a Chinese
Face: Socially Embedded Factors in the Transformation from Hierarchy to
Market, 1978-1989, 5 J. CHnEsx L. 143, 157-62 (1991) (analyzing the proper
role of law in the resolution of contract disputes within Chinese relational
communities).
60. See generally Tahirih V. Lee, Courts and Commercial Dispute Resolution in Early Twentieth Century Shanghai, 47 U. Mum L. REv. 1335 (1993)
(telling the story of the courts and the marketplace in Shanghai before 1949
and revealing the significance in the study of the relationship between legal and
economic processes).
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must rely on mediation and arbitration, 6 1 or the more common
route of guanxi (personal connections), 62 to resolve disputes.
C.

IMPETUS, JUSTIFICATION AND THE REVIVAL OF CoMPANY
FORMATION

1.

China's Rising Investor Class as a Motivation for
Company Law Enactment

China's move toward company formation is partly motivated by the surge in domestic personal wealth that has occurred since 1978.63 Private citizens in China have $361 billion
in personal savings available for investment.6 4 The Chinese
government is attempting to "tap into the well of 'mattress
money' that is kept by individuals" 65 to create more capital for
expanding industries. It wants to provide a mechanism to raise
61. See, e.g., Michael Palmer, The Revival of Mediation in the People'sRepublic of China: (2) JudicialMediation, in YEARBOOK ON SOCIALIST LEGAL SysTEMS 145, 147 (W.E. Butler ed., 1989) (discussing China's emphasis on extrajudicial, as well as judicial mediation of disputes).
62. Hu and Sweet describe the workings ofguanxi as follows:
Foreign companies find that, in certain areas of Chinese business, few
or no laws apply. In these ambiguous situations, they propose a legal
framework for the due diligence process, only to find their Chinese
counterparts offering instead guanxi to help if anything goes wrong. In
the worst cases, false documents are provided through guanxi to overcome difficulties. Westerners tempted by these offers would never
dream of taking such a leap in their home countries.
Hu & Sweet, supra note 52, at 14.
63. The Chinese savings rate is about one-third of the country's gross domestic product, making the Chinese some of the biggest savers in the world.
Thomas T. Vogel, Jr., The Cash Cache, WALL ST. J., Oct. 2, 1995, at RIO.
64. CPC Plenum to Okay China's Ninth Five-Year Plan, Asian Political
News, Sept. 25, 1995, at 5, available in WESTLAW, FARNEWS Database; see
also Sally Gibson, Gold Fever Strikes as Chinese Seek Haven for Bloated Savings, NIKKE! WKLY., May 17, 1993, at 23 (stating that recent demands for gold
by the Chinese are due in part to their high levels of private savings). In addition, the lifestyles of Chinese are changing rapidly, with lavish dinners and expensive vehicles becoming more commonplace. See Anne F. Thurston, A Society
at the Crossroads,C~mnA Bus. Rav., May-June 1994, at 16 ("Fortunes are now
pursued with the same single minded enthusiasm that once characterized political campaigns against landlords and rightists."). Prices for property sold privately have escalated to the point that some areas of the country are more
expensive to live in than many U.S. cities. See, e.g., Mitchell Pacelle & Joseph
Kahn, For U.S. Developers, China Offers Opportunity, Risk, WALL ST. J., Oct.
18, 1994, at B4 (detailing the head-long rush by developers to build office space
in China's largest cities). Some commentators believe that China's government
sees this trend as a threat to its political legitimacy and ability to lead. Bersam, supra note 30, at 304 (explaining China's motivation for privatization).
65. Edwarde F. Webre, CompaniesLimited by Shares-A New PRCInvestment Vehicle, in 1 Cx 's NEW Com'mUEs: NATIONAL FRAMEWORK 2, 5 (Philip
Rapp & Nicole Yuen eds., 1993) [hereinafter CHNA's NEw CompmmP
Rs.
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capital from domestic and foreign investors. 66 A system of
shareholding and stock exchanges provides the most effective
vehicle for tapping into the vast pool of underutilized capital.
Since 1986, the government has allowed thousands of for67
merly state-run enterprises to convert to stock companies.
Companies are now listing on the newly-formed Shanghai and
Shenzhen stock exchanges, as well as on a few foreign exchanges. 68 A particularly revealing facet of most of these offerings, however, is that China's government, through its various
ministries, maintains a controlling share in the new venture. 69
The state is thereby able to continue its control over the economy and business operations in China. Accordingly, this new
method of privatization is in essence merely a form of limited
privatization.7 0 This limited privatization allows the Party to
draw on the Marxist principle that so long as the government
retains a majority share in the enterprise it remains in the "peo71
ple's" hands.
66. See Torbert, supra note 33, at 11-13 (discussing the implications of the
Company Law for foreign investors in China).
67. They were created under the then-existing local regulations. Nicole S.
Yuen, Introductionto 1 CmNA's NEW COMPANIES, supra note 65, at ii [hereinafter Yuen, Introduction].

68. See, e.g., Li Hong, More State Firms Liable for Profits and Losses,
CHINA DAILY, Aug. 12, 1993, at 1 (stating that China plans to transform onethird of its state firms into companies with limited liabilities, many of which
will list on the Chinese markets); David Whittall, Heavy HittingH Shares:Baring H Share Index, CHINA Bus. REv., May 1994, at 44 (tracking the development of China's securities market since 1990).
69. Ren Kan, The State of the State's Shares, CHINA DAILY, May 3, 1993, at
3 (introducing the three types of shares for domestic shareholders in China).
70. Bersani, supra note 30, at 306 (analyzing China's privatization
scheme). See generally Andrei A. Baev, Civil Law and the Transformationof
State Property in Post-Socialist Economies: Alternatives to Privatization, 12
UCLA PAC. BASIN L.J. 131, 185-87 (1993) (discussing the reasons for government control over economies in socialist countries).
This limited privatization also answers some of the 'old guard's" concerns
that SOE assets will be sold at below value when an SOE is listed on the new
exchanges. Yuen, supra note 67, at vii (discussing roadblocks to China's privatization drive). Their fear is that the state will lose out financially by selling or
transferring its assets to the state-owned turned private enterprises. Beijing
attempts to ameliorate these concerns in the new Company Law by providing
that state-owned assets cannot be converted at depressed prices. Company
Law, supra note 12, art. 81.
71. See Bersani, supra note 30, at 305-06 (explaining the rationalization of
"the basic principle of Marxism that the 'ownership of the means of production'
must remain in the hands of the state as surrogate for all the people"). "At the
core of the [reforms] will be the separation of government and enterprise-or
more precisely, the separation between the Government's economic management functions and its role as the custodian of state assets." Xiao Yu, China:

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 80:503

2. The Condition of State-Owned Enterprise as a Motivation
for Company Law Enactment
In Western corporate organizations management is accountable to shareholders through the shareholders' voting
rights. 72 Shareholders have a direct monetary interest in the
company's profitability and, in theory, will elect new management when the current management fails to act in the shareholders' best interests.7 3 The possible loss of employment is an
inherent motivational reality that spurs management toward
profitable business decisions.
China's government now recognizes this aspect of corporate
structure as a powerful incentive. 74 Due to the poor economic
performance of SOEs, this motivational force has become a major impetus behind the enactment of the Company Law and
China's shift toward a market economy. 75 A brief examination
of China's post-Mao policy on SOE management structure7 6 and
the difficulties China faces in developing a market-driven economy helps provide an understanding of the role management
Backingfor State Firms, S. CINA MORNING PosT, Nov. 7, 1994, at 4. Beijing is
able to squelch the people's demand for investment opportunities, while remaining in control of their investments. Bersani, supra note 30, at 306.
72. See, e.g., MIN. STAT. § 302A.437(1) (1994) (establishing the shareholders' right to take action by voting).
73.

2 MODEL BusiNEss CORP. ACT ANN.

§§ 7-3, 7-91 (3d ed. 1985).

74. See Peng, supra note 9, at 1 (reporting on recent discussions by Chinese
economists on the state sector's continued financial difficulties and Beijing's
response).
75. David Ho, China's Company Law: Something Concrete to Go By, E.
AsIAN ExucuTIvE REP., Feb. 15, 1994, at 9, available in LEXIS, NEXIS Library,
EASIAN File. By 1956, SOEs made up almost all of the enterprises in the PRC.
See Hazard, supra note 28, at 179 (discussing the overwhelming prominence of
state direction in enterprise development). Today, they continue to account for
the largest part of the market. Small state-owned enterprises number more
than one million and there are more than 200,000 large and medium-sized
SOEs. State-Owned Enterprises' Development Prospects, BBC Summary of
World Broadcasts, Aug. 12, 1994, available in LEXIS, NEXIS Library,
BBCSWB File. They continue to account for almost 50% of the national gross
industrial value and 60% of government revenue. Id.
76. The Chinese version of an SOE is different from that instituted in the
former Soviet Union. The majority of China's SOEs are not held by the central
government, but rather by local, provincial, and municipal governments. See
Clarke, supra note 25, at 5-6 (noting the minimal central commodity planning
in China compared to the former Soviet Union). This adds to the difficulties
encountered by the central government in enforcing its mandates. See supra
text accompanying notes 40-47 (noting the tendency of local authorities to only
enforce national regulations that benefit their locale).
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should7 play in companies formed under the new Company
Law.

7

By the end of 1994, forty-one percent of China's SOEs were
running in the red.78 Many commentators on China point to inferior management as one of the most significant factors affecting the poor performance of SOEs. 79 Substandard management
stems in part from the relationship between local Communist
Party officials and SOE management.8 0 The Party forces SOE
managers, many of whom are Party officials, to walk a tightrope
between answering its requests and meeting production goals
that originate in Beijing.8 1 Managers are, therefore, often unable to focus on the enterprise's profitability. SOE managers
must adhere to the interests of local Party officials.8 2 This subordination to the Party leads to widespread inefficiency and corruption.8 3 Managers are not forced to answer to those who have
77. For a valuable collection of articles on Chinese reforms, see generally
(Elizabeth J. Perry &
Christine Wong eds., 1985).
78. China Plans New Bankruptcy Law, supra note 52, at A5. Forcing
China's SOEs into bankruptcy has been difficult. Id. According to China's
State Economic and Trade Commission, only 2000 of the almost 30,000 stateowned industrial enterprises suffering losses have applied for bankruptcy since
1986, id., despite the fact that by February 1994, SOEs were running at a deficit of more than twenty-nine billion yuan (US$3.5 billion), Ho, supra note 75, at
9.
79. CPPCCMembers on State Enterprises, Xinhua News Agency, Mar. 11,
1994, available in LEXIS, NEXIS Library, XINHUA File. See Ho, supra note
75, at 9 (discussing rationales for the Chinese government's plans to inculcate
competition into state enterprises); Michael Hirsh, China:Anatomy of a Privatization-Yizheng Chemical Fiber, INsTrrUTioNAL INV., April 30, 1994, at 85.
80. An example of this exists in an SOE manager's right to hire and fire
employees. "[T]he right to hire and fire appears to exist... in name only. Enterprises almost uniformly report that [the] provisions of the State-Owned Enterprise Law cannot be realized in practice" because of the party controls on
enterprise. Clarke, supra note 25, at 43 (footnotes omitted).
81. See generally id. at 45-51 (discussing the ambiguity of provisions making the SOE director the "central" figure in the organization, yet requiring him
to "accept supervision" from the Party hierarchy overseeing the enterprise).
82. See Roy F. Grow, Resolving Commercial Disputes in China: Foreign
Firms and the Role of ContractLaw, 14 Nw. J. INTL L. & Bus. 161, 166 (1993)
(describing the changing allegiances of the Chinese factory manager). In doing
so, the manager hoped to acquire "more personnel, lower [production] targets,
increased pay for workers, and new equipment;" all measures of success for the
SOE. Id.
83. See, e.g., Rone Tempest, China: Curious Chinese Make Crime Pay,
GuARDIAN, Nov. 7, 1994, available in WESTLAW, INT-NEWS Database ("Even
senior Chinese officials admit that corruption has become rampant since Deng
Xiaoping began liberalizing the economy.... [Tihe special prosecutor's office
has handled 2,143 cases of corruption since 1990. The cases involved 41 senior
officials, including two ministers."); Thurston, supra note 64, at 18 (stating that
THE PoLIrIcAL ECONOMY OF REFORMI IN POST-MAO CimNA
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a real financial stake in the business's performance-the shareholders.8 4 Beijing recognizes that real accountability to shareholders who can fire substandard management gives SOE
leaders the necessary incentive to ensure that they use their
best efforts to turn a profit.8 5
3.

China's Gradual Shift Toward Company Formation

The Chinese began experimenting with stock companies to
satisfy Beijing's call to increase SOE productivity.8 6 The process began in an ad hoc manner when China allowed, and in
some cases even forced, SOE employees to acquire shares in
87
their SOEs under Party policy decisions.
This slow, deliberate approach was consistent with the
usual course of Chinese law making. First, China usually allows
provincial and municipal bodies to experiment with various reform measures.8 The Beijing government then formulates its
own policy at the national level based on successful local regulation. 89 Beijing followed this approach when it enacted China's
new Company Law. 90
economic reforms are leading to corruption and uncertainty for the people and
that "the communist hierarchy has gone topsy-turvy").
84. Ho, supra note 75, at 9 (discussing the difficulties with China's past
system of SOE management).
85. "[Biased on the reality of joint-stock enterprises, [we must] work creatively and promote the development of the joint-stock system's standardized
operations, so that enterprises constantly improve economic returns." Wang
Linhua, Characteristicsof and General Plan for Party Committee's Leadership
of Joint-Stock Enterprises,LINGDAO KEXUE [LEADERSHIP Sc], Jan. 11, 1995, at
36, 36-37, translated in and microformed on F.B.I.S.-CHI 95-067, Article on
PartyRole in Joint-Stock Enterprises,Apr. 7, 1995, at 33.
86. See supra note 78 and accompanying text (describing the inefficiency of
SOE's).
87. Jia Zhao & Li Qian, TradingStocks in China:Development, Regulation,
Issues and Prospects, E. AsriA EXEcUTrVE REP., June 1992, at 8, available in
LEXIS, NEXIS Library, EASIAN File. "These early shares of internal stock
resembled bonds. The stock was redeemable at specified maturity dates, could
be called by the enterprise, and did not provide the holder with any voting
rights." Bersani, supra note 30, at 307 & n.12; see also Yuen, Introduction,
supra note 67, at vi (noting the early Chinese experiments in establishing companies limited by shares).
88. Conner, supra note 8, at 17 (describing early local statutes).
89. See id. (writing about the progression of "Zhao Ziyang's call for the enactment of laws and regulations" protecting private enterprise's interests).
90. See Torbert, supra note 33, at 3 (noting experimentation in the creation
of the Shanghai and Shenzhen stock markets). A draft Company Law had been
in the works for at least ten years. Bersani, supra note 30, at 307-08.
China's "long-awaited" securities regulatory framework exceeds the scope
of this Note. China's State Council has promulgated securities regulatory pro-
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China's State Council 9 ' created the first nationwide com-

pany regulation in 1992.92 Although this regulatory measure
did not have the status of law from the National People's Congress, it set general guidelines for the shareholder and director
relationship in stock companies and was the forerunner of the
Company Law. 93 By enacting the Company Law, Beijing revamped the regulation and strengthened many of its
94
provisions.
visions that attach to the Company Law. For information on these provisions,
see Fears Over H-Share Rules, S. CHINA MORNING POST, Oct. 23, 1994, at 4,
availablein WESTLAW, CHINAPOST Database (discussing the additional provisions affecting joint-stock companies) and Regulations on Overseas Listing of
Stocks, BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, Oct. 26, 1994, availablein LEXIS,
NEXIS Library, BBCSWB File (reporting numerous provisions that affect stock
marketed outside of China).
91. China's State Council is essentially made up of China's cabinet level
ministers and is the highest regulatory body in the country, although it is not
capable of enacting laws on the level of the National People's Congress.
92. Yuen, Introduction, supra note 67, at vi. In 1992, the Shanghai and
Shenzhen municipalities and Guangdong Province enacted a series of local regulations meant to provide for and oversee the formation of companies. For
these regulations, see Shanghaishi Gufen Youxian Gongsi Zhanxing Guiding
[Shanghai Municipality, Companies Limited by Shares Tentative Provisions]
(1992), translatedin 2 CHINAs NEW CoMPANIES, supra note 65, at 2; Shenzhenshi Gufen Youxian Gongsi Zhanxing Guiding [Shenzhen Municipality, Companies Limited by Shares Tentative Provisions] (1992), translated in id. at 30;
Guangdong Gufen Zhi Shidian Zhengce Cuoshi (Guangdong Province, Experimental Share System Policy Measures] (1992), translatedin id. at 138. These
measures were later enhanced through regulatory provisions in the
Guangdongsheng Gongsi Tiaoli [Guangdong Province Company Regulations]
(1993) (repealing Guangdong Province Special Economic Zone Regulations Regarding Foreign Companies, Oct. 20, 1986), translated in id. at 145.
At about the same time, Beijing's State Commission for Restructuring the
Economic System issued its own tentative collection of regulations. This is the
document that was commonly referred to as the "Opinion." Gufen Youxian
Gongsi Guifan Yijian [Standards for Companies Limited by Shares Opinion]
(1992), translatedin 1 CHINAs NEW COMPANIES, supra note 65, at 11 [hereinafter Opinion]. "In one sense, China has had a company law since 1979, but only
one that applied to joint ventures between foreign and Chinese entities"
through the Joint Venture Law. Torbert, supra note 33, at 2 (providing an introduction to China's company formation).

93. The Opinion provided for the creation of stock companies that were
more akin to Hong Kong's company law than to U.S. corporate law. Bersani,
supra note 30, at 309 (discussing this relationship). Nonetheless, the Opinion,
and therefore the Company Law derived from the Opinion, are similar to
United States corporate law.
94. See infra note 121 (discussing a weakness of the Opinion); see also Nicole Yuen, Editor's Notes to CHINAS NEW COMPANIES: THE NEW COMPANY LAW
50 (Philip Rapp & Nicole Yuen eds., 1994) [hereinafter Yuen, Editor's Notes]
(stating that the Company Law has more specific provisions than does the
Opinion).
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II. ENTER THE NEW COMPANY LAW
A. THE COMPANY LAW'S UNDERPINNINGS
The Company Law is another sign of China's shift away
from the command economy advanced under Mao 95 toward one
driven by market-oriented forces. 96 The Company Law provides
a legal framework for the protection of individual and institutional investors, whether they are foreign or domestic. 97 Additionally, the Company Law establishes a mechanism for a
95. See supra text accompanying notes 19-30 (providing a history of the
policy towards private enterprise in China).
96. See, e.g., Lai, supra note 11, at 5 (reporting on the impending stock
exchange listing of a major Chinese telecommunications enterprise). Through
March 1994, there were more than 7 million registered enterprises in China
and, according to official Chinese statistics, 1.44 milion of those were "corporate companies with State, collective, Sino-foreign or private investment." Ma
Zhiping, State Eases Restrictionson Forming Companies, CHNA DAILY, July 1,
1994, available in WESTLAW, INT-NEWS Database. By July 31, 1994, an estimated 54,500 of these 1.44 million enterprises were operational shareholding
companies. Figures Show ShareholdingEnterprisesProspering,XnHUmA, Nov.
3, 1994, translatedin and microformed on F.B.I.S.-CHI 94-213, Nov. 3, 1994, at
46. In a study by the China Enterprise Evaluation Center, Chinese enterprises
recorded greater economic efficiency after they adopted the shareholding system. Id.
There is significant confusion inside and outside of China as to what makes
a company. An example of the mayhem created by the misconceptions is that
many of the farm collectives in rural China are converting themselves into
"companies" where the shareholders are the local villagers and the farmers. Interview with Tahirih V. Lee, Associate Professor of Law, University of Minnesota Law School, in Minneapolis, Minn. (Apr. 27, 1995). That these
"companies" have shareholders might lead a visitor to believe that they are in
fact true companies. This is not necessarily the case, however, because a company is merely an entity created by the state-a fiction for the carrying on of
business. If an entity fails to comply with regulations designed to provide for
that fiction (the structural faculties and registration procedures laid out in the
law) then the "company" is not a company at all, but merely an amalgamation
of individuals who are doing business together. A problem develops when another entity or individual attempts to bring a suit against the "company" for
breach of contract, or other reason, and finds to its embarrassment that the
"shareholders" of that "company" are not registered in compliance with any regulation. The individual or entity is thereafter forced into multiple suits against
the "shareholders" of the "company." Visitors would do well, therefore, to seek
actual registration documentation from the "company," and go one step further
by investigating at the local registry whether the document given them is
legitimate.
97. See Preston M. Torbert, China's New Company Law: Foreign Investment Issues, E. AsIAN ExEcuTrIv REP., Aug. 15, 1994, at 7, available in LEXIS,
NEXIS Library, EASIAN File. The Law confers "legal person" status on these
companies, thereby making them independent legal entities. See supra text accompanying notes 37-39 (setting out the rights and obligations of "legal person"
status).
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shareholding system to transform state-owned enterprises into
market-oriented companies. 98
The heart of the Laws progressivity is Article 102. It provides that shareholders, rather than the state, "shall be the organ of authority of the company."99 Article 14 of the Law, 00
however, retains the spirit of the original model of Communism
in China that commentators refer to as the "Chinese characteristics" 10 1 of reform. The provision states that the new "companies must . . . strengthen the establishment of a socialist
spiritual civilization, and accept the supervision of the government and the public."10 2 Although the statement is probably
closer to Maoist hyperbole than to enforceable law, it continues a
Party-centered dynamic under which China's court system and
administrative agencies will likely operate-and a risk of which
investors should be aware.
98. Company Law, supra note 12, art. 81. Such a mechanism provides ample justification for the Company Law's formation. See supra text accompanying notes 78-85 (discussing the status of state-owned enterprises).
On July 20, 1994, China's State Council released company registration procedures for the Company Law. Regulationsof the People'sRepublic of Chinafor
Administering Company Registration, Xinhua News Agency, translated and
available in, LEXIS, WORLD Library, BBCSWB File [hereinafter Registration
Regulations]. The Registration Regulations establish that China's State Administration for Industry and Commerce is in charge of company registration
work around the country. Id. art. 5. Items needed for a company to register
include name, address, statutory representative, registered capital (at least
100,000 RMB), enterprise category, scope of operation, period of business operation and names of stockholders or the name of the promoter of the company. Id.
art. 9. Under article 3 of the Regulations, a company only receives its coveted
"enterprise legal-person business license" once it registers "in accordance with
the law." Id. art. 3.
99. Company Law, supra note 12, art. 102.
100. Id. art. 14.
101. See, e.g., Solomon M. Karmel, Note, Emerging Securities Markets in
China: Capitalism with Chinese Characteristics,140 CoINA Q. 1105, 1105
(1994) (describing the state's purchase of the majority of newly issued securities
in a Chinese company as the "defining characteristic of China's emerging 'capitalism with Chinese characteristics'"); Qian, Why Does Not the Rising Water
Lift the Boat?, supra note 47, at 617 (analyzing "the emerging conflict or inconsistency between some of the uniquely Chinese characteristics" of China's securities regulatory regime); Qian, Riding Two Horses, supra note 2, at 92
(noting that the "Chinese characteristics" relate to public social welfare functions such as provision of hospitals, eating facilities and pre-school child care
for enterprise employees);
102. Company Law, supra note 12, art. 14. Some commentators consider
this provision closer to canonical law than corporate law because it seems almost ecclesiastical with its spiritual language. Rowan Callick, China: Credibility of Chinese Laws Under Scrutiny, AusTaRAAm
Fni. REv., Dec. 9, 1994, at 23.
They explain that the provision serves to raise questions about the status of
companies in China and the Law's legitimacy. Id.
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THE NEW LAW

The Company Law creates two classes of companies: limited liability companies' 0 3 and companies limited by shares. 0 4
Companies limited by shares are commonly referred to as jointstock companies. 10 5 This Note focuses on the Company Law's
treatment of these joint-stock companies because of their wide
06
investment potential.
The Company Law guarantees a joint-stock company limited liability and provides for the division of its registered capital into shares.' 0 7 Like American corporations, shareholders
103. Limited liability companies are sometimes seen as something akin to
closely held corporations in the United States. See Vivienne Bath, Introducing
the "LimitedCompany," CHINA Bus. REV., Jan.-Feb. 1993, at 50, 52-53 (comparing new Chinese security regulations to existing regulations in the United
States). "The terminology used in this area can be confusing.... [T]he term
'limited liability company,' used in Hong Kong and certain states in the United
States, also refers to a form of corporate organization that is treated as a partnership for tax purposes." Bersani, supra note 30, at 308 n.16. For an illuminating side-by-side comparison of the two classes of new companies see Preston
M. Torbert, Broadening the Scope of Investment, CHINA Bus. REv., May-June
1994, at 48, 49.
104. Company Law, supra note 12, art. 2.
105. Ho, supra note 75, at 9.
106. Limited liability companies must have more than two, but less than
fifty shareholders. Company Law, supra note 12, art. 20. Only joint-stock company promoters can make public offerings for sale of a company's stock. Id. art.
74. Shareholders in both forms of companies are liable to the company to the
extent of their capital contribution. Id. art. 3. In cases where an SOE is reorganized to become a wholly state-owned, limited liability company that produces
products determined by the State Council to be of national importance, or is
involved in a similarly special industry, the new company is not obligated to
establish a shareholder's general meeting. Id. arts. 64, 66. These wholly stateowned limited liability companies must have boards of directors, not simply executive directors. Id. art. 68.
107. Id. arts. 19-36. The national company regulation China issued prior to
promulgation of the Company Law provided that shares could be ordinary or
preferred and were to be divided into classes according to the nature of the
party that held them. Gufen Zhi Qiye Shidian Banfa [Share System Experimental Enterprises Procedures], arts. 3-4 (promulgated May 15, 1992), translated in 1 CINAS NEW CoMPANils supra note 65, at 7-8. Pursuant to this
regulation, the Commission issued on the same day the Opinion. See Opinion,
supra note 92.
The Company Law changed direction by providing that all prospective
shareholders could purchase stock based on the type offered by the company.
Company Law, supra note 12, art. 130. The promoters of the new joint-stock
company, however, must subscribe to at least 35%of the total number of shares
offered, and in the case of enterprises other than a restructured SOE, more
than half of the five or more promoters must have their domicile in the PRC.
Id. arts. 75, 83.
The minimum amount of registered capital, unless provided for in other
laws and administrative regulations, is ten million renminbi ($US1.2 million).
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exercise control over their contributions and receive a share of
profits from the enterprise' 0 8 in proportion to the number of
shares they own.10 9 Under the Company Law, shareholders
elect directors in accordance with the number of voting shares
owned by each shareholder. 110
The board of directors"' in the newly formed company has
the responsibility of appointing and removing management at
Id. art. 78. Upon establishment, a joint-stock company is liable to its creditors
up to the value of its registered capital. Id. art. 3. After the national or locally
responsible body carries out an investment certification and the new company
issues share certificates, the promoters have thirty days in which to convene an
inaugural shareholders' meeting. Id. art. 91. The shareholders must then have
at least a yearly meeting to carry out their obligations. Id. art. 104.
108. Id. art. 103. Shareholders can then assign these shares, subject to certain restrictions, and the company, can repurchase the shares in some situation. Id. arts. 143-147, 149. Importantly, an SOE or an entity formed under
the Company Law can invest up to 50% of its net assets in another company.
Id. art. 12. In this way, an SOE actually can have the controlling share in a
new enterprise formed under the Company Law. Id. Because this 50% figure
does not include the profit from asset investment the company returns into the
new enterprise to provide additional capital for it to operate, i.e., profit capitalization, an investing company's share of the new enterprise could grow over
time. Id.
109. Shareholders enjoy rights and assume obligations based on the number
of shares owned. Id. art. 106. They exert a degree of control over the operations
of the company through their ability to attend and vote at shareholders' meetings. Id. art. 103. Like shareholders of U.S. companies, shareholders in the
new Chinese companies have the right to attend meetings in person or by
proxy, inspect corporate records, receive dividends, and receive the residual
value of the company's assets in the event of liquidation. Id. arts. 108, 110, 177,
195. The shareholders may approve matters involving the company's finances
and profit distribution plans, including amendment of the company's articles of
association and approval of mergers and liquidations. Id. art. 103. More than
two-thirds of those shareholders in attendance at the general meetings must
adopt amendments to the articles. Id. art. 107. If subscribers representing
more than half of the total number of outstanding shares are present, the
shareholders can meet for the first time. Id. art. 92. By a simple majority vote
of those in attendance, the shareholders at this inaugural meeting can approve
the articles and elect board and supervisory board members. Id. art. 92(2)-(4).
Shareholders owning 10% or more of the company's equity also have the right
to convene an extraordinary shareholders' meeting to discuss important issues.
Id. art. 104(3).
110. Id. art. 103(2).
111. Id. art. 112(8)-(10). Unlike the U.S. model, a supervisory board, of
which the shareholders and the company's workers elect constituent parts, can
oversee the board of directors. Id. arts. 124, 126; see infra note 130 (discussing
the difference between the Chinese supervisory board and audit committees in
U.S. corporate law).
A company can have from five to nine directors, with the chairperson the
"legal representative" of the company. Id. arts. 112-113; see supra note 39 and
accompanying text (discussing the requirements for legal-person status under
the Civil Law). A majority of the directors elects the chair and vice-chair. Coin-
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its highest level. 112 Similar to the bylaws of most United States
corporations, 1 1 3 the company's articles of association set forth
management's rules for operation. 114 Shareholders 16 15 elect directors, but cannot remove them except for cause."1
Directors and managers ultimately must answer to shareholders under the Company Law. Accordingly, the members of
management are supposed to make decisions based on the best
interests of shareholders, instead of the members' or third parties' personal concerns. Article 123 of the Company Law states
that "[t]he directors and the manager shall ... faithfully per-7
form their duties and protect the interests of the company.""
Yet, by simultaneously maintaining the company's duty to the
"socialist spiritual civilization,"1 8 the Company Law provides
the Party with a justification for upholding a director or manager's decision that the Party deems to be in the best interests of
the country, but not necessarily of the company.
The Company Law sets out several provisions, however,
that could ultimately work to protect the fiduciary relations inherent in a corporate setting. The Company Law requires directors to execute their official duties and to protect the company's
interests without exploiting their position and power in the company. 1 9 Similarly, the law contains duty of loyalty provisions
pany Law, supra note 12, art. 113. The articles of association set forth the arrangement for the "composition, functions, powers, term and rules of procedure"
of the board in a joint stock company. Id. art. 79(7). A director may serve a
term of three years, with reelection possible. Id. art. 115.
112. Company Law, supra note 12, art. 112(9). The management office,
under the direction of the board of directors, runs these companies. Id. art. 119.
The manager attends the directors' meetings as a nonvoting attendee. Id. art.
119. Depending on the company's articles, the board or manager can appoint
deputy managers. Id. art. 119(6). The promoters, through the company's articles, can vest in the manager hiring and firing authority. Id. art. 119(8). The
manager can in this way have broader powers than his or her SOE
counterparts.
113. See, e.g., Minm. STAT. § 302A.181 (1994) ("Bylaws may contain any provision relating to the management of the business or the regulation of the affairs of the corporation not inconsistent with law or the articles.").
114. Company Law, supra note 12, art. 79.
115. See supra notes 108-110 and accompanying text (discussing the duties
of shareholders).
116. Company Law, supra note 12, art. 115.
117. Id. art. 123. In the United States, a fiduciary obligation exists when
someone has a duty to subordinate his or her own personal interests in favor of
another's benefit. BLAcK's LAw DICTIONARY 625 (6th ed. 1990). This "is the
highest standard of duty implied by law." Id.
118. Company Law, supra note 12, art. 14.
119. Id. arts. 214-215.
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like those found in U.S. corporate law. 120 Commentators practicing under the common law system see these new provisions as
"a step further towards the concept of 'fiduciary duties' under
12 1
common law."
Other provisions in the Company Law also work specifically
to protect investors from possible breaches of fiduciary duty.
The Company Law sets forth a series of prohibitions that,
among other things, disqualify government officials from serving
concurrently as directors or general managers, 1 22 prohibit directors and managers from taking bribes or accepting illegal income, 12 3 and preclude directors and managers from entering
1 24
contracts with the company except in limited circumstances.
For example, a director may not contract with the company to
supply equipment directly to the company from the director's
own business without the authorization of the company's articles or its shareholders. 125 The Company Law also holds directors, supervisors, and general managers liable for violations of
26
the Company Law's duty of care and loyalty provisions.1
Finally, the Company Law requires a Chinese joint-stock
company to maintain a supervisory board. 12 7 Shareholders and
the company's staff and workers elect constituent parts of this
120. Under the Company Law, directors or managers may not engage in the
same type of business as the company for which they work. Id. arts. 61, 123.
For similar U.S. provisions, see CorporateDirector'sGuidebook, 33 Bus. LAW.
1591, 1599 (1978) [hereinafter Guidebook] ("When the corporate director has a
material personal interest in a contract or transaction to which the corporation
is to be a party,

. .

. the director should disclose the existence of such an

interest.").
121. Yuen, Editor's Notes, supra note 94, at 50 (discussing the differences
between the Opinion and the Company Law). Yuen points out that the weaker
regulatory Opinion that preceded the Company Law completely failed in this
regard and that China is attempting to make strides toward real fiduciary protections with the adoption of these new provisions. Id. The Opinion defined the
duty of directors as an obligation to fulfill "earnestly and diligently" their roles
as management in the company. Opinion, supra note 92, art. 62.
122. Company Law, supra note 12, arts. 58, 123. In addition, directors cannot lend or misappropriate company funds, open their own accounts for deposit
of company funds, or use company equity as security for debts of shareholders
or other persons. Id. arts. 60, 123. The Company Law also prevents directors
from disclosing company secrets unless allowed to do so by law or according to
the shareholders' wishes. Id. arts. 62, 123.
123. Id. arts. 59, 123.
124. Id. arts. 61, 123.
125. Torbert, supra note 33, at 7.
126. Company Law, supra note 12, art. 63. Under the current state of the
court system in China, it is hard to determine the exact loss to the company.
See supra part I.B.3 (discussing the problems with China's court system).
127. Company Law, supra note 12, art. 124.
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board. 128 The board's functions are to supervise staff and ensure that the actions of the directors and management are in
compliance with other PRC laws and the company's articles.1 29
The supervisory board has the authority to require a director or
manager to "correct" an illegal act or one that violates the jointstock company's articles.1 30 Overall, the Company Law represents a good foundation for the beginnings of corporate activity
in China despite provisions favoring the central government.131
C.

ESTABLISHING

FIDucIARY DuTY: A BASIc

RUN-THROUGH OF

TrE U.S. CORPORATE LAw DuTy OF CARE DocTRINE

As a point of comparison, U.S. corporate law ensures at
least a minimal level of fiduciary protection to minority shareholders through the duty of care doctrine, as limited by the business judgment rule. 132 The fundamental principle underlying
128. Id. Although the promoters set out the general composition of the supervisory board in the company's articles of association, the Company Law requires that the staff and workers elect an "appropriate proportion" of the
members of the board. Id. In addition, the supervisory board must have at
least three members, who serve three years with the possiblity of reelection. Id.
art. 125.
129. Id. art. 126(2).
130. Id. art. 126(3). In doing so, the supervisory board has the right to examine the company's books and propose interim shareholders' meetings. Id.
art. 126(1), (4). Like a company manager, supervisory board members must
attend meetings of the board of directors as nonvoting attendees. Id. art. 126.
What effect the supervisory board will have on the amelioration of a breach of
fiduciary responsibility in a new company is uncertain.
Although some writers compare these supervisory boards to audit committees in U.S. corporate law, Anthony Tyen & Hong Ying, FinancialManagement
of China's New Limited Companies, in 1 CnBmA's NEW COMPANIES, supra note
65, at 46, 47, the supervisory boards are very different in their composition.
Unlike the composition of supervisory boards, outside directors typically compose entire audit committees. Under the June 30, 1978 New York Stock Exchange listing requirements, for example, employees and officers of the
company cannot qualify for committee membership. See Guidebook, supra note
120, at 1624 n.1. An'audit committee's purpose is also much different than that
of supervisory boards laid out in the Company Law. Audit committees have
four purposes: to recommend an independent auditor; to consult with that auditor; to review the audit; and to consult with internal auditors in conjunction
with independent auditor work. Id. at 1626-27.
131. Although joint-stock companies have been operating in China for some
time now, the government has only recently promulgated measures regulating
their establishment and operation. Vivienne Bath, Introducing the "Limited
Company", CHINA Bus. REV., Jan.-Feb. 1993, at 50, 50-51; see also supra text
accompanying notes 69-71 (discussing the limited privatization of domestically
traded companies).
132. See Lutz v. Boas, 171 A.2d 381, 395-96 (Del. Ch. 1961) (holding that
complete abdication of directorial responsibilities breaches the duty of care).
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the corporation is that a board of directors as fiduciaries or
trustees of the company manage the corporation's affairs.1 3 3 In
the early case of Litwin v. Allen,'3 4 a New York court stated that
a director is "required to use his independent judgment.... He
must also exercise some degree of skill and prudence and diligence ....
In other words, directors are liable for negligence in
the performance of their duties."1 35 A director must, therefore,
use that degree of care that a reasonable person would exercise
36
in a similar circumstance.'
The business judgment rule later qualified this proposition.
Stated broadly, the rule "is a presumption that in making a business decision the directors of a corporation acted on an informed
basis, in good faith and in the honest belief that the action taken
was in the best interests of the company."' 37 Applying this rule,
courts in the United States generally will not disturb business
decisions or "second-guess the board's judgment or find liability
for honest mistakes of business judgment." 3 Shareholders
questioning a decision of the board in a derivative action must,
furthermore, comply with the "demand" requirement of the
board spelled out in Aronson v. LewiS' 3 9 and thereby use their
intra-corporate remedies first, before bringing the case to court.
133. See Smith v; Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858,872 (Del. 1985) (holding that a
board had breached its fiduciary duties to the shareholders when it approved a
proposed merger without information regarding the intrinsic value of the
company).
134. 25 N.Y.S.2d 667 (N.Y. App. Div. 1940).
135. Id. at 677-78.
136. Section 8.30 of the Revised Model Business Corporation Act (RMBCA)
contains the Act's standard for directors. Its duty of care provisions state that:
(a) A director shall discharge his duties as a director, including his duties as a member of a committee:
(1) in good faith;
(2) with the care an ordinarily prudent person in a like position
would exercise under similar circumstances; and
(3) in a manner he reasonably believes to be in the best interests of
the corporation.
REVISED MODEL Busmnxss CORP. ACT § 8.30 (1984).
137. Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984). Therefore, in order to
gain the benefit of the business judgment rule, the directors must have had no
conflict of interest, gathered prior to the decision a reasonable amount of information, and made the decision in a deliberate and not wholly irrational manner. See Smith, 488 A.2d at 872-73.
138. E. Norman Veasey, New Insights into JudicialDeference to Directors'
Business Decisions: Should We Trust the Courts?, 39 Bus. LAw. 1461, 1464
(1984).
139. 473 A.2d at 811-12. Aronson held that a derivative shareholder need
not make a demand on the board if "a reasonable doubt is created that: (1) the
directors are disinterested and independent and (2) the challenged transaction
was otherwise the product of a valid exercise of business judgment." Id. at 814.
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The business judgment rule provides directors with great flexibility in making business decisions and makes derivative actions
increasingly difficult to maintain in the United States unless
140
there is a gross breach of duty on the part of the directors.
III. FIDUCIARY DUTY IN THE OWNERSHIP AND
CONTROL OF CHINA'S COMPANIES
Still unclear under China's system of corporate governance
is whether the steps taken by the new Company Law will provide sufficient protection to investors, especially minority shareholders in majority state-held joint-stock companies. The
Company Law must protect the "lawful rights and interests of
companies, shareholders and creditors" if China hopes to use effectively the fiduciary relationship that exists in company settings. 14 1 The Company Law must ensure that minority
shareholders in majority state-held companies have a right of
recourse to directors or managers who breach their fiduciary
duty to the company.
A. AN

EXAMPLE AMPLIFYING THE SHAREHOLDER PROTECTION
ENIGMA IN CHINA

Recall the inconsistency of Articles 14 and 102. While the
Company Law provides that shareholders "shall be the organ of
authority of the company," 142 the Law also mandates that new
companies should build the "socialist spiritual civilization, and
43
accept the supervision of the government and the public."'
The following scenario illustrates the contradiction this creates.
In August 1995, Ford Motor Company announced plans to
purchase a twenty percent equity stake in the Chinese company
Jiangling Motors Corporation to produce minivans for the Chinese market.44 Jiangling is a light-truck manufacturer located
in Nanchang, the capital of Jiangxi province in southern China.
Ford paid $40 million for a twenty percent stake in Jiangling
when Jiangling issued new shares on Shenzhen's B-share mar140. Veasey, supra note 138, at 1474-75 (stating that directors do not have
to worry when making most business decisions).
141. Company Law, supra note 12, art. 1 ("This Law is formulated in accordance with the Constitution in order to suit the requirements of establishing a
modem enterprise system.").
142. Id. art. 102.
143. Id. art. 14.
144. Angelo B. Henderson & Craig S. Smith, Ford to Purchase20% Equity
Stake in JianglingMotors, WALL ST. J., Aug. 23, 1995, at A5.
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ket-the only shares that foreigners may purchase. 14 5 The Jiangling Motors Corporation Group (JMCG) retains a fifty-one
percent controlling interest in the corporation with another seventeen percent owned by local investors through Shenzhen's Ashare market-shares that only Chinese may purchase. 14 6 The
agreement to purchase the equity stake entitles Ford to three
directors on Jiangling's nine-member board and five senior management positions. 147 A Ford spokesperson said that the conpany could have purchased a greater stake in Jiangling, "but we
saw no real advantage in that. We can't get a controlling interest in any case." 148 That interest, of course, stays with JMCG, a
state-controlled entity. 4 9 Jiangling remains a majority stateowned joint-stock company publicly listed on the Shenzhen stock
exchange.
Assume that all goes well for Ford in its new venture and
that the new minivans become quite popular for domestic Chinese consumers. 15 0 Jiangling begins to make a profit. In fact, it
is so profitable that by the end of the partnership's first year of
business, Jiangling has money to spare. Assume that at that
point, local Jiangxi officials ask Jiangling's board to make a loan
to one of Jiangxi's failing SOEs. In keeping with China's tight
money policy of the past few years, 1 51 the SOE has been unable
to secure enough credit through its usual channel, the central
government. The local officials sell the loan as a way to
"strengthen the establishment of a socialist spiritual civilization" and diversify Jiangling's investments. 152 In addition, the
officials promise the JMCG majority directors that the SOE will
145. Id.
146. Tony Walker, Ford Skates Around Chinese Freeze-Share-buying
Avoids the Joint Ventures Ban, FIN. TmIEs, Sept. 7, 1995, at 34, available in

LEXIS, WORLD Library, ALLWLD File.
147. Id.

148. Id.
149. Christine Chan, FordStake Puts Brakes on Jiangling,S. CMNA MoRN4, availablein LEXIS, WORLD Library, ALLWLD
File.
150. Apparently, at the time of the Ford announcement, Jiangling was not
the healthiest of companies. The company had debts of over 2.5 billion yuan,
including a 1.9 billion yuan foreign currency loan. Renee Lai, JianglingB
Shares Raise $352m, S. CHINA MORNING POST, Sept. 15, 1995, at 3, availablein
LEXIS, WORLD Library, ALLWLD File. In addition, its operating profit was
ING POST, Aug. 24, 1995, at

down from a year before and the Shenzhen exchange rules did not require the
company to make a profit forecast for the subsequent year. Id.
151. See Chen & Kahn, supra note 7, at A10 (describing China's moves to
reign in inflation by cutting off government credit).
152. See Company Law, supra note 12, art. 14.
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make every effort to pay back the credit. The Jiangxi officials
convince the JMCG directors that an operating loan to the SOE,
full of would-be unemployeds, is the "right" thing to do. Jiangling's board, including the three Ford directors, performs the
usual due diligence as to the SOE's credit-worthiness and determines that a loan to the SOE is not in Jiangling's best interests.
But because of the symbiotic relationship that exists between
the Jiangxi officials and the JMCG directors-and much to the
chagrin of the Ford directors-the JMCG directors approve the
loan.
As expected, the SOE defaults on the loan and Jiangling is
out the money it could have used for development purposes. The
Ford directors strenuously objected to the loan, but, in an effort
not to waste the good guanxi 5 3 they have built with local Jiangxi officials, they decide against bringing an action for breach
of duty. They realize that "[it's going to take time and money
[because] 'It]he transition is still occurring from a socialist economy to a socialist market economy, and that has its

difficulties.'

"-154

Assume further that Jiangling, in spite of the bad loan, continues to be profitable.1 5 5 Other local SOE managers notice, and
soon the JMCG directors have approved three more similar
loans that are all outstanding and in various stages of default.
Tired of what they see as an abuse of discretion by the JMCG
directors,1 56 and clearly wanting to return to the business of
manufacturing minivans, the Ford directors decide to test the
Company Law's fiduciary duty provisions in court. They bring a
case for breach of Article 123's duty to "protect the interests of
15 7
the company."
153. "In short, Ford is entering traditional joint ventures with key Chinese
companies-thereby pleasing a demanding Chinese government and building
guanxi, or connections-while working hard to modernize and expand those
companies." Keith Naughton et al., Ford Opens the Throttle: It's Challenging
Toyota's Dominance in the FarEast, Bus. Wm., Sept. 18, 1995, at 66, 68.
154. Keith Naughton et al., Ford Opens the Throttle, Bus. WY. (Intl ed.),
Sept. 18, 1995, at 24, available in LEXIS, WORLD Library, ALLWLD File.
155. "Amazingly, no listed company has admitted that their [sic] decline in
profits could be the result of... misguided operating decisions." Shuang Mu,
Seven Listed Companies Report Losses in FirstHalf, Bus. WY_ (China Daily
Supp.), Sept. 10, 1995, available in LEXIS, WORLD Library, ALLWLD File.
156. A similar occurrence is quite likely to happen in more and more situations as Chinese "companies [use] their funds in high-risk stock and futures
trading." Id.
157. See Company Law, supra note 12, art. 123.
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This sets up the dilemma for the Company Law. The JMCG
directors must decide whether to work toward the company's
profitability or answer the requests of the Jiangxi officials. A
joint-stock company's business decisions do not "reflect fully
those of a shareholding company in the developed countries" 15
because of the Chinese government's presence in the management of Jiangling, and, arguably, in all aspects of the
economy. 15 9

B.

THE ILL-EFFECTS OF LIMITED PRIVATIZATION ON CIINA'S
CORPORATE SECTOR

The long-term viability and legitimacy of companies in
China depends on the ability of shareholders to make the new
companies respond to market forces. Unfortunately, the Chinese government, whether on the local or national level, has an
overriding influence in economic decisions made by majority
state-owned companies. 160 The influence emanates from "Chinese characteristics" 16 1 of reform and the conception of management and control of joint-stock companies that pervades
162
business in China.
Management accountability is viewed in a different light
than in fully market-based economies, and management in majority state-owned companies sometimes overlooks the interests
158. Qian, supra note 11, at 92.
159. Mr. Jiang Zemin, Communist Party chief, president, military leader,
and heir-apparent to senior leader Deng Xiaoping, continues to take a conservative approach to governing China. His speeches have focused on the theme of
protecting state enterprise's role as the core to the Chinese economy and building discipline in the Communist Party. Kathy Chen & Joseph Kahn, Mr.
Weather Vane: A PliantTechnocrat is in Line to Become Next Leader of China,
WALL ST. J., Feb. 3, 1995, at Al, A8.
160. According to an interview with Hong Hu, Chinas Vice Minister of the
State Commission for Restructuring the Economy, China is now concentrating
on improving the state-owned sector to insure that the "public sector-including the State-owned sector and collectively-owned sector-holds a dominant position in China's economy." PrivatizationNot 'Orientation'for Restructuring,
Xinhua, June 20, 1995, translatedin and microformed on F.B.I.S.-CHI 95-118,
June 20, 1995, at 31 [hereinafter Hong Hul. Consequently, the state-owned
sector plays a leading role in China's economic growth. Id.; see also supra note
74 (noting that state-owned enterprises continue to take up the largest part of
the Chinese economy).
161. See supra note 101 and accompanying text (explaining 'Chinese
Characteristics").
162. See supra note 71 and accompanying text (explaining the theory that
the government must retain majority shares in joint-stock companies to keep
them in the "people's" hands).
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of minority shareholders they are supposed to protect. 163 Concepts such as public disclosure of financial records, 6 4 accountability to shareholders, and equal shares/equal votes are alien in
China. 165 Former SOE managers-turned-joint-stock company
directors in companies where the state has a controlling interest
too often continue to answer the requests of the state or the
Party.16 6
China's continuing state control ideology 1 67 pervades deci-

sions made by the courts and government in China. 68 Government officials within China believe the "joint-stock system is just
a property organization form and does not mean private ownership." 69 A possible effect of the relationship between state control and actual private ownership is that the profits in state
controlled joint-stock companies have begun to falter, while joint
ventures and privately owned companies in China are prospering.' 70 A far more deleterious effect, however, is that the state's
163. See supra notes 69-71 and accompanying text (discussing the ideological underpinnings of enterprise activity in China).
164. One commentator has stated:
Although Chinese stocks that are listed abroad have to meet local standards on releasing information, 'the level of disclosure is still very
poor.... [Tihere are still massive problems in understanding what is
going on with these companies.... [Diomestic accounting varies from
the international accounting systems, so most companies have two sets
of books. Once a year, in theory, you should get accounts that have
been audited by international auditors, but there are gaps in those accounts, and it is still a struggle.'
Harvey D. Shapiro, The Tao of Investing, HImSPHERES, Jan. 1995, at 50.
Andrew Xuefeng Qian cites modernization of accounting and corporate systems
in China as possibly the most important item for China to deal with in internationalizing its securities regulatory regime. Qian, Why Does Not the Rising
Water Lift the Boat?, supra note 47, at 617.
165. Yuen, Introduction, supra note 67, at v (providing an introduction to
possible difficulties China will experience with implementation of company
regulation).
166. See id. (noting that managers of state enterprises have never had to
answer to anyone other than the State or Communist Party).
167. See Hong Hu, supra note 160, at 31 ("The State-owned sector controls
the lifeline of the national economy and plays a leading role in China's economic
growth.").
168. See supra part I.B.2-3 (discussing the State's power to influence decisions made by local governments and courts).
169. Hong Hu, supra note 160, at 31.
170. See Craig S. Smith, Profits at China's State-Run Firms Sank in First
Half,Reflecting Credit Squeeze, WALL ST. J., Sept. 5, 1995, at A12 (noting that
profits of state companies have plummeted); see also Shuang Mu, supra note
155 ("Among 177 Shanghai-listed companies, 89 earned fewer profits compared
with the same period of last year. And 30% of companies suffered a 30% slide in
profits. Of the 122 Shenzhen-listed companies, only 20% saw a rise in their per
share yields.").
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overwhelming presence as a company shareholder might render
the new Company Law's fiduciary provisions meaningless.
1. Protection of Fiduciary Interests Through Shareholder
Meetings?
The Company Law provides a good basis on which to build
China's corporate structure. 17 1 When events similar to those in
the Jiangling example occur, however, protection for investors is
inadequate. Under the Company Law, as in the United States,
the shareholders' first line of control and financial protection
emerges from their right to vote at company shareholder meetings.11 2 Unfortunately, in those companies where a majority of
the shares are controlled by a government entity, the meetings
173
are often a rubber stamp for previously decided state actions.
The Company Law, like Western corporate law, effectively
excludes minority shareholders from determining the business
policies and plans of the company.17 4 Although minority shareholders have a right under the Company Law to call an extraordinary board meeting to consider an issue,1 7 5 the
shareholders cannot change the course of business decisions
made by the board or dismiss a director without cause. 7 6 Thus,
the shareholder's minority status, like that of the Ford directors
in the hypothetical, eliminates an important means of recourse
against the management of the company through the shareholding system itself.

171. See Ho, supra note 75, at 9 (noting that the Company Law gives foreign
investors "something more concrete to go by than mere opinions and unpublished rules vaguely quoted by state officials").
172. See supra text accompanying notes 73-74 (discussing a shareholder's
voting power).
173. "Theoretically investors are supposed to be able to select top officers
and managers in a company, influence the annual report, discuss future investment, and so forth. . . . ifet a Huadong University Professor of Politics and
Law, described a shareholders' meeting he had attended as a Joke,' followed by
a banquet." Karmel, supra note 101, at 1113 n.35.
174. Directors are elected by the shareholders; thus, the same situation occurs when minority shareholders attempt to replace certain directors. Company Law, supra note 12, art. 103(2).
175. See id. art. 104(3) (requiring an extraordinary shareholders' meeting if
requested by shareholders owning 10% or more of the company's shares).
176. See id. art. 39 (requiring that resolutions be adopted by two-thirds or
more of voting shareholders).
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2. Protection of Fiduciary Interests Through Supervisory
Boards?
A second possible avenue for minority shareholders might
come through notifying the company's supervisory board about
the situation so that the supervisory board can "correct" the
1 77
decision.
Unfortunately, under the Law a "proportion"178 of the supervisory board are also shareholders, and most likely majority
shareholders. If, as in the Jiangling example, the majority is
representative of a state entity that controls the board of directors, the supervisory board's own willingness to remedy a minority shareholder's complaint proves problematic. This is
especially true where the head of the supervisory board is a
Party member.1 7 9 It is unlikely that the supervisory board will
provide recourse for a minority stock owner because the supervisory board in a majority state-controlled company almost always
will be made up of Party members.
3.

Other Avenues of Possible Fiduciary Protection

Likewise, unless the directors simultaneously serve as government officials or in some other way violate the Company
Law's explicit prohibitions, 8 0 those stipulations do not provide
any recourse either. Minority shareholders inevitably have little or no recourse to the management of a majority state-owned
company through the channels explicitly provided in the Law.1L8 1
The "limited privatization" 18 2 of companies saps the vitality
of a market that could protect minority rights. If a large number
of share subscriptions existed such that a majority of the shareholders in the Jiangling example were private individuals or
177. Id. art. 126(3). If some minority shareholders are employees of the
company, they can be elected by their coworkers to serve on the supervisory
board and thereby take up the issue. Id. art. 124.
178. Id.
179. The Party Committee Secretary, Chairman and General Manager of
the Shenyang Materials Development Corporation wrote that in joint-stock
companies "party organizations [must] play their role as the political nucleus;
and for the party organizations to play this role they must, based on the characteristics of a joint-stock enterprise, carry out and implement the party's line,
principles, and policies in the enterprise." Linhua, supra note 85, at 34.
180. See supra text accompanying notes 119-131 (discussing the provisions
of the Company Law).
181. See supra notes 108-110 and accompanying text (referring to the power
of shareholders to manage the company through their voting power).
182. See supra notes 70-71 and accompanying text (discussing China's cautious approach to privatization).
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non-state-controlled institutions, the situation could change because private shareholders would theoretically demand profitability in cases where the state would balk.' 8 3 Because the
Party is still prone to serve its own interests when the situation
demands, rather than the interests of profitability,' 8 4 minority
shareholders in a majority state-owned joint-stock company
judicial system or guanxi to resolve busimust turn to China's
85
ness disputes.'
C.

JUSTICE THROUGH THE CHINESE JUDICIARY?

Although the decision in the Jiangling example may remain
standard in China, it would not be considered "business as
usual" in developed countries.' 8 6 Assume that the loan to the
fictional Jiangxi SOE would be considered a gross abuse of discretion by U.S. courts. Under the "legal person" status provided
for in the Company Law,' 8 7 and guaranteed under China's Civil
Law,' 8 8 Ford's minority directors should be able to bring a deriv183. For a different view, see Lincoln Y. Rathnam & Viswanath Khaitan,
Privatization:An Investor's Perspective, PuB. UTIL. FORT., Jan. 1, 1994, at 17
(outlining the benefits of state, as opposed to private ownership). "Investors are
generally better off with offerings where 1) the government continues to own a
majority of the shares... [and] 2) new management runs the business as a
business." Id.
184. See supra notes 86-87 and accompanying text (discussing SOE
productivity).
185. See supra note 63 (discussing the use of guanxi in the everyday business dealings of foreign business persons).
186. Qian, supra note 2, at 92.
187. Company Law, supranote 12, art. 3; see supra text accompanying notes
36-39 (describing the legal person fiction).
188. Included in the Civil Law is a description of the rights and obligations
of an agent to their principal, the enterprise legal person. Civil Law, supra note
32, ch. IV, § II. Unlike agency principles in the United States, see, e.g., RE_
STATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY §§ 160-161, 194 (1958), the Chinese principal
has the power to repudiate the agent's acts committed outside the scope of the
agency relationship:
With respect to acts committed without the power of agency, beyond
the power of agency or after the termination of the power of agency, the
principal shall bear civil liability therefor only after such acts have
been ratified by the principal. The actor shall bear civil liability for
any act that has not been ratified. Any principal who is aware that
another person is implementing civil acts in the name of the principal
and does not make a declaration of repudiation shall be deemed to
have consented thereto.
Any agent who fails to perform his duties causing losses to the
principal as a result thereof should bear civil liabilities.
Civil Law, supra note 31, ch. VI, § II, art. 66. "[An agent's acts that are ultra
vires are, seemingly, not binding on the principal unless the principal ratified or
acquiesced to the agent's acts." Gary J. Dernelle, Direct Foreign Investment
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ative suit as agents on the company's behalf against the JMCG
directors.1 89 While it appears Ford may have a valid claim
against the JMCG directors, that may not be the case in China.
The conflicting language of the Company Law1 90 and the
subordinate position of the judiciary in China's governmental hierarchy1 91 hampers a shareholder's legal recourse. Article 123
of the Company Law requires directors and managers to protect
the company's interests. 192 This requirement is offset by Article
14s duty to "strengthen the establishment of a socialist spiritual
civilization, and accept the supervision of the government and
the public."1 93 Due to the difference between the Chinese con-

cept of fiduciary responsibility and that of their Western counterparts,1 9 4 it is doubtful that a Chinese People's Court would
find a loan to a failing SOE sufficient to penalize the directors. 195 Moreover, the conflicting language of the Law adds to
the difficulty by allowing directors a great deal of flexibility
when making business decisions. Chinese courts, especially lo-

and ContractualRelationsin the People'sRepublic of China, 6 DEPAUL Bus. L.J.
331, 344-45 (1994). If such an act occurs, the Civil Law provides that the agent
assumes civil liabilities. Civil Law, supra note 31, ch. VI, § I, art. 106. These
civil liabilities can take several forms and can include compensation for losses.
Id. ch. VI, § IV, art. 134.
189. Although the Company Law does not set out an explicit provision guaranteeing the right to bring a suit derivatively by a shareholder, especially a
foreign minority shareholder, Article 111 of the Law appears to grant that
right. Article 111 provides that "[wihere a resolution of the... board of directors ... infringes the lawful rights and interests of the shareholders, the shareholders concerned shall be entitled to apply for an injunction in a People's court
to terminate the violation or infringement." Company Law, supra note 12, art.

111. When read together with the Civil Law and the Company Law's mandate
on directors to "faithfully perform their duties and protect the interests of the
company" under Article 123, it appears that minority shareholders can at least
bring an injunction against the board for a breach of fiduciary duty and then
seek damages on behalf of the company for that infringement.
190. See supra text accompanying notes 99-102 (discussing the inconsistencies found in the Company Law).
191. See supra part I.B.3 (discussing the status of the court system).
192. Company Law, supra note 12, art. 123.
193. Id.
194. See supra notes 78-85 and accompanying text (detailing the influence
the Party exerts on management and how that influence affects management's
ability to make independent decisions).
195. See supra notes 69-71 and accompanying text (explaining the concept
of limited privatization that allows the Chinese government to remain in control of enterprises).
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cal ones,1 96 likely would uphold the decision of1 the
directors
97
based on the directors' responsibility to the state.
Alternatively, in the event that a judge decides to interpret
the Company Law to actually create director liability to shareholders for a board of directors' poor business judgment, local
Party officials could step in and override the ruling.'9 8 The
Party has ultimate control over court decisions because the
Party remains at the top of the Chinese hierarchy. Using the
Ford fiction, if the Party believes that the JMCG directors' decision to loan money to the failing SOE was good for the Jiangxi
community, Ford is probably not assured of adequate recourse
through the Chinese court system. Thus, China's laws "do not
adequately protect shareholders, especially the minority
shareholders."' 99
IV.

COMPANIES FOR THE FUTURE

Although the Company Law is Western in form, 20 0 it lacks
the substance needed to protect shareholder property rights
from fiduciary breaches found in other corporate codes. Unfortunately, there is little possibility that the Chinese legal and
regulatory system in its current state will provide that substance. 20 ' Judicial and administrative bodies could do so, however, by clarifying the inconsistencies in the Company Law to
make management accountable to shareholders through a preferential reading of Article 123's duty of interest to the company
over Article 14's duty to the country. Minority shareholders
could bring claims to clarify the rights and duties stemming
from the language of the law.20 2 The judicial and administra196. For example, local exchange officials in Shanghai were able to protect
"big local traders during a bond-futures scandal last February that nearly toppled the city's leading broker." Bruce Einhorn & Dexter Roberts, China'sOther
Exchange Reaches for the Spotlight, Bus. WK., Sept. 25, 1995, at 106.
197. See Company Law, supra note 12, art. 14 (explaining the responsibilities companies have to the state).
198. See supra notes 48-62 (referring to the problems created by the Communist Party's influence on the Chinese courts).
199. Qian, supra note 2, at 92.
200. See supra part H. B (discussing the structure of the Company Law).
201. See supra part III.B.2 (noting the Party's influence on companies' supervisory boards).
202. See supra notes 58-62 (arguing that it would be beneficial for the judicial system of China if plaintiffs brought their actions to court, rather than try
to work through the processes associated with using guanxi to resolve
disputes).
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tive bodies' actual ability to protect shareholders, however, continues to be a matter for the future.
A more timely solution would be for the National People's
Congress to ameliorate the problem by striking the inconsistent
provisions in Article 14.203 This would prevent a court or political official from falling back on the language of that article to
override the director's duty to the company's interests. The Chinese leadership should simultaneously add a duty of care provision similar to those found in United States corporate law. The
Company Law should demand that directors perform their duties "in good faith20 4 . . .with the care an ordinarily prudent
person in a like position would exercise under similar circumstances[ ] and... in a manner [they] reasonably believe[ ] to be
20 5
in the best interests of the corporation."
A Chinese court or administrative agency deciding a duty of
care dispute might then use as a model the textbook New York
Supreme Court case, Litwin v. Allen. 20 6 In that litigation, the
owners of thirty-six shares of stock of the Guaranty Trust Company brought a derivative suit against the directors of the Guaranty Trust Company. 20 7 They sought to impose liability on the
directors of the Trust Company for losses incurred as a result of
a securities purchase the directors made that amounted to a norisk, low interest loan.208 The plaintiffs asserted that the Trust
Company lost $2.25 million because the loan was unsecured. 20 9
The Litwin court held that "the entire arrangement was so improvident, so risky, so unusual and unnecessary as to be contrary to fundamental conceptions of prudent banking
practice." 2 10 The court concluded that "[ulnless we are to do
away entirely with the doctrine that directors of a bank are lia203.
204.
porting
sidered

See Company Law, supra note 12.
'his phrase means honestly or in an honest manner. A director purto rely upon information which he knows to be untrue will not be conto be acting in good faith." Guidebook, supra note 120, at 1601.
205. REVISED MODEL BusINEss CoRP. AcT § 8.30 (1984) (emphasis added).
"[Blest interests of the corporation .... This phrase is an expression of that
component of the duty of loyalty involving the corporate director's primary allegiance." Guidebook, supra note 120, at 1601. This standard is different than
that provided by Article 132 of the Company Law because there is no common
law negligence type of standard provided in Article 123. See Company Law,
supra note 12, art. 123.
206. 25 N.Y.S.2d 667 (Sup. Ct. 1940).
207. Id. at 675-76.
208. Id. at 676-77.
209. Id. at 676.
210. Id. at 699.
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ble for negligence in administering its affairs liability should be
imposed in connection with this transaction."2 1 1
Finally, China's reasonable person standard should be
viewed not as a reasonable person in China influenced by the
effect of political pressure, but by a reasonable person that takes
into account what that person as a board member or manager
should be responsible for-making the joint-stock company profitable. The Jiangling hypothetical illustrates a situation where
minority shareholders could base a claim on the new provisions
if they are added by the National People's Congress. Presumably, the financial records and projections of the failing SOE show
that the enterprise was not a profitable undertaking for Jiangling.2 12 The directors, therefore, are unable to rely on the
business judgment rule to exculpate them from liability because
the records clearly show that the SOE would likely default on its
repayment obligation. 2 13 If directors are required to "act in good
faith," even minority shareholders will be guaranteed a certain
amount of protection from dubious director decisions in majority
state-owned joint-stock companies. Adding stronger fiduciary
provisions to the Company Law will improve the position of all
shareholders in the new companies and help to solve the
problems associated with the Chinese legal system. This will
add legitimacy to the Chinese court system and China's business
environment. Directors who breach their duty to shareholders
will have to compensate the shareholders, whether foreign or domestic, for losses caused by their negligent or fraudulent
2 14
decisions.

211. Id.
212. The JMCG directors would not meet the standard required by the business judgment rule. That rule provides:
A director exercising his good faith judgment may be protected from
liability to his corporation under the Business Judgment Rule.... For
the Business Judgment Rule to apply, a director must have acted in
good faith and with a reasonable basis for believing that the action
authorized was in the lawful and legitimate furtherance of the corporation's purposes, and must have exercised his honest business judgment
after due consideration of what he reasonably believed to be the relevant factors. The Business Judgment Rule will not apply in situations
where conflict of interest or other breaches of the duty of loyalty are
present.
Guidebook, supra note 120, at 1604.
213. See supra notes 137-140 (discussing the U.S. business judgment rule).
214. See Company Law, supra note 12, art. 118 (discussing director

liability).
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CONCLUSION
China has pursued a revolutionary pace of reform since
Deng Xiaoping's assumption of power in 1978. An important
part of the reform movement has been the evolution of a corporate form of enterprise common to free-market Western countries. For Beijing to regulate these new creatures and provide a
way for the state to deal with bloated SOEs, China promulgated
a national framework in the form of the Company Law.
Absent from the new Company Law, however, are provisions ensuring real protection for shareholders who are not associated with the government. Because complete privatization of
stock ownership in China is not likely for the foreseeable future,2 1 5 foreign and domestic Chinese investors in new companies will need enhanced guarantees of fiduciary accountability
so that enterprises in which they choose to invest will continue
toward profitability and investment growth. Such protection
can come about through amendments to the Company Law and
the establishment of a legal system that is independent of Party
functionaries.

215. As an example of how far China has yet to go, a member of the Chinese
People's Political Consultative Conference National Committee said in an interview "that the ongoing reform of state enterprises in China should separate
distinct property rights from ownership because enterprise reform has nothing
to do with ownership." Wang Yuxia, EnterpriseReform Separate Issue From
Ownership Rights, Zhongguo Xinwen She [China News Agency], Mar. 5, 1995,
translatedin and microformed on, F.B.I.S.-CHI 95-044, Mar. 7, 1995, at 48 (interview with Rui Xingwen).

